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Dedication

To Ousmane Sembene, who sparked my interest with beautiful
historical inaccuracies.

From a 1947 striker’s poster: “Tout travail doit nourrir son homme (All work must nourish its
man),” quoted in Mor Sene La Grève des Cheminots, 64.
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I. Abstract
This project examines the history of the Dakar-Niger railroad from its birth to its
decline to illuminate the nature of the rail strike of 1947-1948 in French West Africa. The
strike would prove to be a landmark in the continuous resistance of colonized peoples against
the colonial state. The railroad was and is a physical as well as an invisible presence in the
economic, political, and social history, and the connections that would form around this
history of resistance and of colonialism from its earliest days would come to define not only
the strike but the history of Senegal and of West Africa in general. In this endeavor, archival
and secondary data collection formed the brunt of research, but interviews with historical
witnesses and participant observation of ex-colonial railroad sites proved invaluable to the
project. In analyzing the patterns of connection, coercion and and resistance that came out of
this research, the project examines colonial policies and practices, individual and collective
strikes, the community ties that solidified the unionism, and the politics and ideologies that
shaped or attempted to shape the labor movement.

II. Introduction
At midnight on October 10, 1947, most of the African workers on the Dakar-Niger,
Abidjan-Niger, Benin-Niger, and Conakry-Niger railways of l’Afrique Occidentale Française
(AOF) walked off the job. Most of these workers, or cheminots, continued to strike for five
months and ten days, essentially blocking all colonial raw material export in AOF until
returning to work on March 19, 1948. The length of the strike, its minute organization, and
the unity and resolve of the strikers have been preserved and recorded in multiple fashions,
through memory, historical analysis, and fiction, each way enriching as well as altering the
facts of the strike. The strike has reached a mythical status among cheminots and historians
alike, an event that is often linked to the struggle for independence and to anticolonial politics,
either in its initiation or its conclusion. The reality, however, was much more complicated,
and this study seeks to unpack and re-examine the web of African and Senegalese politics,
anticolonial and pro-French rhetoric, and union struggles that lie behind the 1947 railway
strike to better understand the motivations and results of the strike.
The Dakar-Niger, the rail line that is the focus of this study, helped extend colonial
control and expand the economic exploitation of l’Afrique Occidentale Français (AOF). At
the center of the desire for colonial political and economic control was a desire to exploit
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labor, and “even the basic requirement of improved transport, road and railway construction,
was ultimately related to the urgency for releasing human labor used in porterage to other
forms of production labor.” 1 The railroad was inextricably linked to colonial coercion, which
took the form of territorial expansion and forced labor on the line’s construction and
elsewhere, as it also forced Senegalese to migrate into or out of French control or to resist
against French forays into their lands and lives.
It also allowed the evolving French colonial mission in the interwar and postwar
periods to be furthered, namely the increase in infrastructure and the tightening of “control
and stabilization” in the labor force, 2 even as “proletarization” of the Senegalese labor forces,
evident in the 1938 railway strikes, 3 began to force changes on the colonial system as well.
The French labor policy was then designed so that it divided the most skilled, valuable
workers from others by creating different salary and benefit levels, 4 or cadres. As colonial
rhetoric changed, so did Senegalese assertions of basic rights and protections, which pointed
to the unfulfilled promises of the French Republic, such as equality for Senegalese and French
alike. As Ibrahima Sarr, the cheminot union leader, said in 1946, the cadre system was
comprised of “antiquated colonial methods condemned even by THE NEW AND TRUE
FRANCE which wishes that all its children…be equal in duties and rights and that the
recompense of labor be a function solely of merit and capacity.” 5 This employment of French
assimilationist language would prove to be an effective if controversial tool, at least among
scholars who have studied the strike.
The Dakar-Niger played the central role in the creation and perpetuation of the 19471948 strike, which grew out of intense dissatisfaction with the unequal cadre system, a visibly
racist structure that institutionalized higher wages and benefits for whites and a select few
Senegalese but categorized most Senegalese as part-time laborers—even workers of several
years. Young workers from the Union des Jeunes de Thiès (UJT), mostly educated railway
clerks, “brought out a youthful vigor against the perceived lethargy of older Senegalese
politicians and a new combativeness towards the French,” 6 and revitalized the cheminot union

1

Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800 (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998), 99.
2
Frederick Cooper, “‘Our Strike’: Equality, Anticolonial Politics and the 1947-48 Railway Strike in French
West Africa,” in The Journal of African History, vol. 37 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84.
3
Freund, 118.
4
Steven Feierman, “Social Change in Colonial Africa,” in African History: From Earliest Times to
Independence, 2d ed (London: Pearson Education, 1995), 510.
5
Cooper, “Our Strike,” 87.
6
Cooper, “Our Strike,” 85.
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in Thiès by ousting the old leader and putting in the younger and more dynamic UJT leader
Ibrahima Sarr.
Once the strikes ended after “cinq mois et dix jours (five months and ten days),” which
was a phrase continually repeated by all interviewed informants, the strikers had made very
few material gains that they would not have received in earlier conciliation meetings. The
end of the strike did, however, signal a new relationship for politicians and the union, who
became a fixture of Senghor’s party in later years.

It also established that colonized

Senegalese and West Africans had some power to resist racist colonial practice, especially
when they remained together in a visibly united and numerous front, attacked an economic
vulnerability, and actually kept striking. Many historians argue, in fact, that the railroad
strikes contributed to the blossoming of national consciousness and the independence
movement, as do many ex-strikers.
The political implications of the strike, however, have been subject to a historical
debate, some arguing for the strike as a vital aspect of pro-independence and anti-colonialist
movements and others arguing the opposite: that the strike was actually reliant on French
rhetoric around equality and on the French labor system to formulate and defend their
demands. Frederick Cooper, in his paper ‘Our Strike’: Equality, Anticolonial Politics, and the
1947-48 Railway Strike in French West Africa, which looks specifically at the strike and
makes extensive use of oral histories from ex-strikers, takes the position that earlier studies
concocted an “all-too-neat assimilation of social and political struggles [that] is a matter of
hindsight.” He argued instead for the necessity of the French connection for the strike’s
success, but Cooper writes, this connection still “needs to be unpacked.” 7 In his massive
volume Décolonisation et Travail en Afrique, which examines labor in British and French
Africa from 1935 to independence, Cooper became even more radical in his opinion, arguing
that the strike was actually a power struggle between the union and the management, whose
structure was rather “a French structure than a backward colonial organization based on race
(une structure française q’une organisation coloniale arriérée basée sur la race).” 8 James
Jones’s work Industrial Labor in the Colonial World, which examined the history of the
railroad from its conception to independence, focusing more on the Soudan than Senegal,
argued: “It [the strike] showed that despite decades of effort to ‘industrialize’ Africans, wage

7

Cooper, “Our Strike,” 82.
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earners remained linked to their society in ways that could oppose French assimilation.” 9
Mor Sene, in his master’s thesis La Grève des Cheminots du Dakar-Niger, argued for the
strike as a “form of colonial resistance…that seemed to put colonial domination in question in
struggling against the discrimination in salaries and in work conditions (une forme de
résistance contre le colonialisme…[qui semblait] remettre en question la domination coloniale
en luttant contre la discrimination dans les salaire et dans les conditions du travail).” 10
Although Jean Suret-Canale’s La Grève des Cheminots Africains d’AOF focuses on the idea
that the strike grew out of a French Cold War distrust of unions and Communism, he points
out that the rail strikers in AOF actually fared better than their French counterparts who were
striking in France at the same time, and that their struggle, which came at a time of popular
agitation in many sectors, had an “undisputable significance (signification incontestable).” 11
Malick Sow, in his master’s thesis Thiès et ses Cheminots dans le Mouvement Syndical
Sénégalais focuses on the youth unionists that came out of Thiès who demands “were implicit
in the sensitive question of independence (posent en filigrane la sensible question de
l’indépendance).” 12 Omar Guèye wrote that unionists in this time period were “nationalists
who were unaware of themselves : their demands at the most basic raised more questions
about the colonial presence than the structure of the administration (nationalistes qui
s’ignoraient: leurs revendications dans le fond, remettaient plus en cause la presence colonial
que la structure de l’autorité administrative).” 13
In this large body of work, the question of the nature of the strike and of strikers’
intentions in striking is examined, but conclusions vary. The adamance of ex-strikers over
their autonomy from political parties also complicates the issue. This project, however, seeks
to study the political and ideological nature of the railroad strike of 1947 and to add another
viewpoint to the historical record. In so doing, the study looks at the conditions in colonial
practice and resistance, to those practices, from the earliest conception of the railroad, that set
the stage for the showdown that was 1947. From the "scramble" for Africa through the First
World War, the majority of what would become the Dakar-Niger was built, and in its
construction established racist labor divisions, forced labor, and the beginnings of individual
9

James A. Jones, Industrial Labor in the Colonial World : Workers of the Chemin de Fer Dakar-Niger 18811963 (Portsmouth : Hienneman, 2002), 64.
10
Mor Sene, La Grève des Cheminots du Dakar-Niger 1947-1948, master’s thesis, (Dakar: UCAD Faculté des
Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 1986-1987), 121.
11
Jean Suret-Canale, La Grève des Cheminots Africains d’AOF (1947-1948), UCAD Reserves, 121.
12
Malick Sow Thiès et ses Cheminots dans le Mouvement Syndical Sénégalais 1882-1962, master’s thesis
(Dakar: UCAD Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 2003-2004), 3.
13
Omar Guèye Le Mouvement Syndical au Sénégal Pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, post-graduate thesis
(Dakar: UCAD Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 1990-1991), 29.
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resistance that would quickly turn into unified mass resistance. In the Inter-War period,
French colonial philosophy underwent a rhetoric change that nonetheless only proved the
Janus-faced nature of the colonial enterprise where fact and idea were on opposite sides.
Furthermore, the cheminots exerted themselves as a group and in striking, fell into the rifts
that the administration had careful constructed : those of job status and race. World War II
proved a turning point, when militants questioned not only the fascist Vichy regime but
pointed to the similar colonial policies that the Free French government had with its wartime
enemy as a way to achieve labor reforms. After the war, the French government further
altered its philosophies to instate an assimilationism that would provide challengers to the
system with a new method to force the colonial administration to fulfill its promises. The
strike of 1947-1948 grew out of all of these previous factors and ingeniously exploited the
strengths, such as the close-knit nature of the cheminot community, that colonialism had
unwittingly imparted to its second-class "citizens." After the strike, however, the rail lost its
signficance in the community and the union became too enmeshed in politics to function in
the same way, as politicians highjacked the wave of support after the strike for their personal
gain. Ironically, it was African politicians and not the French colonials that sounded the death
knell for the union’s former power : those very leaders who had not only promised
independence but who had seemed to achieve it ultimately turned their backs on the unionists
that had bolstered them.

III. Methodology
Research took place in Dakar and Thiès. Dakar is home to numerous libraries and
reading rooms of Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD), which were imperative resources for
the study, as well as the Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS). Dakar was also a strike
hotbed, and many living remnants of the strike era and colonialism, namely old colonial
structures, such as the train station, cheminot housing, and the rail line, as well as ex-strikers,
were all found in Dakar. Thiès is also a site of living history, and the town is imbued with its
colonial past and with its strong connections to the railroad—it grew out of the rail line, and
some of the most definitive labor agitation, such as the bloody auxiliary strike of 1938, first
came out of Thiès. It was home to the rail union headquarters for all of AOF during the strike
period, and it has a history as a site of radical, anticolonial, and/or union presence. Quartiers
in the city still carry the names of strike heroes, such as Cité Ibrahima Sarr, which envelops
the train tracks with its rail company buildings, old colonial European cheminot housing, and
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a monument to the cheminots at the intersection leading into the neighborhood. Retired
cheminots still sit around under the trees together. Thiès was also the site of a series of
interviews conducted in 1994 by Professor Babacar Fall, Fred Cooper, and university students
for research and the preservation of Senegalese oral history and testimony. As such, both
areas provided vital information to the project, and the rail line that connects them further
enhanced research, providing a physical and visual link between the two strike sites.
Archival data collection took up the brunt of the research, since the strike occurred 60
years ago.

Secondary data was imperative to the project, providing historical contexts,

opinions, and theories that aided in shaping a thesis and in understanding the events as they
occurred. This research took place at Université Cheikh Anta Diop in the main library,
especially the reserves, in the library of the History Department and in the library at the
Institut Fondemantal de l’Afrique Noire (IFAN), as well as at the West African Research
Center (WARC) and online. Documents took the form of scholarly articles, books, interview
transcripts, and theses, and some of these books and articles came straight from the professors
who had wrote them or who had collaborated on research. Many of these documents were for
on-site research only and several, such as UCAD’s master’s and post-graduate theses, which
came out of the UCAD and History Department libraries, were only available in Dakar. Other
scholarly articles online or also available in print in the US indicated and noted researchers,
documents, and archives that were only accessible in Senegal, such as the numbers for files in
the ANS or the names of Senegalese ex-strikers interviewed for past research and the
Senegalese scholars who interviewed them.
Archival data, or primary documents, included taped interviews from a Senegalese
oral history project (unfortunately of poor quality), memoirs, colonial publications, films, and
newspaper clippings and colonial records from ANS. These provided an immediate historical
connection and a record of events from the principal actors. This type of data had an easily
discernible bias that enhanced the study by offering a range of opinion, from, for example, the
anti-colonial, even anti-Senghor stance of Mamadou Dia in Mémoires d’un Militant du TiersMonde, to the 1931 book on the railroad published by the Gouvernment Général de l’AOF
that celebrated the sacrifices of French officers and deplored the attitudes of African rail
workers. These documents came from IFAN, ANS, the Institut Français, and professors. All
of these were accessible only in Senegal, and they forced research to take on a more analytical
form, since the thesis or patterns behind the information were harder to discern.
The study of material data took up the last aspect of archival data collection, and
coupled with participant observation, allowed a visual representation of the history. The
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Dakar-Niger still runs to Bamako, despite limited service, and riding the train from Dakar to
Thiès was included in research time, as were visits to the old gares or stations at the two
research sites, as well as to old colonial rail buildings, such as the ancient lodgings for
European cheminots in Cité Ibrahima Sarr. Dakar and Thiès provided a large amount of
material data to sit in, walk through, and ride on, and all of it added to an overall
understanding of the historical space, the importance of the railroad in Senegalese life and of
the imposition of a colonial presence that still reigns in some parts of Senegal.
Participant observation as a method helped in this endeavor, since sitting in these old
colonial spaces and analyzing their usage today underlined the importance of the railroad and
of the presence (or lack thereof) of rail unions today. Participant observation took place on
the train, in the two gares, on the streets of Thiès during the May Day workers’ march, and in
the old rail quartier Cité Ibrahima Sarr.
Interviews were also conducted with retired cheminots and ex-strikers in Dakar and
Thiès. The interviewees were all of a very mature age, and locating anyone to interview at all
relied heavily on dumb luck: visits to friends of friends, the gare, and to the rail headquarters
in Thiès provided lucky breaks, since, sixty years after the strike, there are a diminishing
number of strikers or even cheminots with a living memory of colonialism available for
interviews.

These interviews provided a living testimony to the events as they occurred,

though none of the interviews were without bias. Those conducted with cheminots not
involved in the strike provided an opportunity to study the perception of the strike from those
who worked with or near to the strikers. Interviews with strikers revealed a deep desire for
their version of the truth, to set the record straight, even if their eyewitness records could not
help but be shaped by bias, reactions to historical events, and their experiences during and
after the strike.
There were many advantages to the study’s methodologies. First, the chosen locations
provided research opportunities available nowhere else in the world, from access to professors
that had written on the strike, to documents for on-site consultation only, such as the nondigitalized ANS records and UCAD theses. The historical sites visited and experienced for
the project were similarly only visible on-location.

Interviews subjects, who were

haphazardly discovered and were of an old age, were also only available due to location
selection.
The disadvantages, similarly, were that the limited nature of the documents and sites
meant they were often difficult or time-consuming to access. The files at ANS, for example,
were not well set-up for random searching; they required a previous knowledge of which files,
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in the correct numerical notation, were needed, and research without such knowledge was
very slow. The non-digitalized nature of catalogues at IFAN, as well, made it difficult to find
sources without having a pre-made list, especially for a researcher using many of these search
methods for the first time.
Archival research was extremely informative and extremely broad. The body of work
that made up secondary data was intimidatingly large, a phenomenon which was
advantageous in that it allowed for a thorough study of the strike and disadvantageous in that
it was extremely time-consuming in an already short time period.

Heavy reliance on

secondary data also runs two risks: first, that the researcher does not take adequate advantage
of site-specific data and second, that original conclusions are more difficult to form. This was
countered by an effort to use secondary data only available in Dakar, such as university theses
or the film on the Dakar-Niger shown at the Institut Français in Dakar.

The primary

documentation, or archival data, was also hard to access or of deteriorated or poor quality,
such as many of the archive files from ANS and the taped interviews provided by a professor,
and it also required a certain level of historical knowledge to analyze, making it difficult to
attribute collected data to a specific theory. This, however, provided its greatest advantage:
primary documentation cannot be divorced from its inherent bias, since it is often a record onthe-ground from principal actors. This factor gave this section of data a breadth of viewpoints
and offered the opportunity for the author’s independent analysis. Material data, like archival
data, was imperative to an independent understanding and analysis of the available strike data,
even if it was often run-down and overwhelming, such as the train or the gares.
Participant observation allowed research to extend to a physical interaction with the
material, which helped broaden the scope of data collection to an area outside the typical
historian’s realm of books and printed material and out of the past and into an understanding
of the present condition of the rail, the cheminots, and their union. The problem with
participant observation was that in its limited time frame, it was more difficult to draw
conclusions about, for example, union presence in Thiès, and the deteriorating and oftenrepaired historical sites were neither entirely preserved in their original forms nor were they in
any way marked to better confirm their identity and use. For example, the old colonial
buildings in Cité Ibrahima Sarr looked just like the Thiès houses for European cheminots
pictured in a 1931 colonial publication, but no plaque or monument expert was available.
Finally, interviewing provided the most fruitful and the most problematic of
methodologies. First of all, all interviews took place right after meeting informants for the
first time, that is to say, there were no preliminary meetings to establish rapport. Secondly,
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most of the interviews required some form of interpretation, either from a third party or from
one informant translating on-the-fly for a second informant. The interviews were conducted
by the author in French and/or with a translator in Wolof. Thirdly, the interviews were never
in closed, neutral settings, and they were conducted, for two of the three interview sessions,
with two cheminots at a time. Last of all, proper ethics were followed as closely as possible,
but given the time frame, education and language levels of most of the informants (and the
language limitations of the researcher), and the drop-in nature of the interviews, only oral
consent was appropriate, and in one case, an informant asked for compensation, which was
paid by the translator, who was reimbursed later by the author. The difficulty in finding
contacts contributed to these disadvantages, a factor that came out of the time frame and out
of the elderly nature of informants. The author feels that even though all of these factors
should be considered in examining informant evidence, the testimonies themselves still
provide an extremely important portion of the study.

The interviews are critical to

understanding the reality of the 1947-1948 strike, which, according to informants, has been
marred by politicians, historians, and writers, but has also been rewritten by strikers and by
their cheminot comrades.

IV. Results and Analysis

From the Scramble to World War I:
The Early Colonial Project and the First Stages of Railroad Construction
Colonialism came early to Senegal, as it was one of the export centers for the TransAtlantic slave trade. Forays into the interior, however, took longer to arrive. At the second
wave of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the US in the late nineteenth century, “the
capitalist quest for raw materials” increased dramatically, 14 and the “virgin” land as well as
the untapped consumer market in the interior of the African continent became increasingly
attractive, spurring the “Scramble” for Africa among the European powers. Furthermore,
France was feeling bruised after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Thus, the
colonial enterprise presented a way to “restore national pride,” a call echoed and carried out

14

Freund, 78.
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by disgraced military officers dispatched to the colonies, 15 to gain control over and to explore
the interior. The great problem of the colonial system for its administrators, however, was the
constant fight for enough funding, and metropolitan budgets forced the colonial governments
to run conquest and control on the cheap, which often meant that administrators and military
men resorted to coercive measures, such as forced labor, to save money.
The idea for a railroad connecting the Niger River to the coast sprung up very early in the
French colonial conquest of West Africa. The idea, according to a 1912 AOF report for the
railroad from the Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS), originated with Louis Faidherbe,
Governor-General of Senegal from 1854-1865. “From 1863 he preoccupied himself with
opening to French trade the reputedly rich and populated regions that constituted the
Soudanese empire (Dès 1863 il se préoccupa d’ouvrir au commerce français les regions
réputées riches et peuplées qui constituaient l’empire soudanais).”16 For historian Mamadou
Diouf, colonial railroad projects were a way to address the colonial state’s inability to
establish political control and to develop an economic system beneficial to the Métropole. As
it became increasingly unstable to rule the populations in Senegal, the instatement of military
controls was the only option, but it “disturbed the commercial transactions and rendered
impossible the installation of ‘peace and tranquility’ favorable to peanut cultivation, which
was the basis of the faidherbian theory and the colonial expansion taken up by the Third
Republic (Cela perturbait les transactions commerciales et rendait impossible l'instauration de
“la paix et la tranquilité” propices à la culture arachidière, base de la théorie faidherbienne et
l'expansion coloniale reprise par la IIIe République).” 17 Furthermore, a rail was needed
beyond the economic: it was militarily necessary for “the pacification of the Soudan and of
the Niger River Valley (pour le pacification du Soudan et de la vallée du Niger),” according to
the Gouvernement Général de l’AOF text. 18 Resistance along the railroad in West Africa
came early, following the coercive tactics instated by the colonial administration: “[The
railroad’s] realization created vigorous skirmishes between the colonial administration and the
tradition powers, anxious to preserve their independence and seeing in the construction of the
railroad a menace for their sovereignty (Sa réalisation donna lieu à de vives escarmouches
entre l’administration coloniale et le pouvoir traditionnel soucieux de préserver son
15

Jones, 3.
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1990), 264.
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indépendance et qui voyait dans la construction de la voie ferrée une menace pour sa
souveraineté).” 19 In this background of economic expansion, injured national ego, cheap
conquest, and increasing agitation on the part of semi-colonized peoples, the railroad was
born. The railroad evolved from colonial thinking as an almost natural progression, as
conquest and coastal or border trade expanded and deepened into the unexplored interior.
Colonial ideology at this time was interested in little more than conquering “unknown”
territory, restoring national prestige, and making a buck or two along the way. Interestingly,
even as colonial rhetoric evolved over the years, the conduct established in these early years
remained the basis of colonial practice throughout the rest of the colonial period.
The Ministre de la Marine (Minister of the Navy) submitted a proposal on February 5,
1880, for the railroad that would become the Kayes-Niger, linking the Kayes area to the Niger
River in present-day Mali, and after later construction, the Dakar-Niger. The line became
“the great commercial artery (la grande artère commerciale)” of the colonies of the AOF.
Despite its “strategic utility (utilité stratégique),” the line was built with a small metropolitan
budget, which greatly limited its commercial and economic functioning in later years. 20 The
Ministry of the Navy was selected to build the line because no private firm would assume
such a great economic risk. The first engineer on the project, Ardaneau, proposed a raciallydivided labor force in October of 1881, a theme that would follow the colonial administration
into the next century and well past the 1947-1948 strike.

He wanted 200 Africans to

load/unload materials, 40 Chinese and 150 Africans to do construction, 50 Africans to
maintain the machines, and 50 Africans to make bricks and tiles. On track construction, there
would be 600 Moroccans to do grading, 200 Chinese to lay track, 275 Chinese for other tasks,
50 Africans for bridge construction assistance and 48 European overseers. 21 In the end,
however, Chinese workers (an idea inspired by the use of Chinese labor on the successful
American Transcontinental Railroad) proved too expensive for more than a few Chinese
laborers for skilled tasks, and the economic crisis from 1878-1882 in Morocco made it easy to
recruit Moroccan workers. The Moroccan labor force, however, was “decimated” by yellow
fever and other illnesses. Local and imported sub-Saharan African labor became the only
choice for a swift and cheap completion of the railroad. 22 The idea of race-specific labor was
not a new idea, but Ardaneau’s proposal laid out in plain sight the racial theories of
19
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colonialism: Africans were “incapable” of doing skilled labor and Europeans should only act
as management. Ironically, although these practices would continue in the colonial workplace
in later decades, the economic constraints of the Métropole made the total accomplishment of
this racial theory impossible at this time, and Africans were put in positions that would lead to
skilled labor employment on the railroad, even as Europeans continued to “supervise.”
In the 1931 Gouvernement Général publication on the railroad, there is no mention of the
imported and local labor forces, merely that the rail construction project was undertaken
February 24, 1881, with a budget of 8,552,751 francs, after no studies or surveys of the land
or any means of communication other than the river, which was only navigable for three to
four months of the year. Despite these conditions of ‘‘certain failure (une échec certaine),’’
the personnel under Ardaneau ‘‘fought against every difficulty with a competence, a zeal, and
a tenacity deserving of the greatest elegies (lutta contre toutes les difficultés avec une
compétence, un zèle, une ténacité dignes des plus grands éloges).’’ Despite the apparently
glorious efforts of the French officers and civilian engineers, there was a fever, a labor
shortage, and not enough materials, so the project failed: between 1881 and 1884, only 54.7
kilometers had been built, at 23,987,000 francs. Between 1885 and 1890, work was officially
stopped. 23 The French press referred to the project as “nos folies de Kayes-Bamako.” 24
Work resumed under the new Commandant-Supérieur du Haut-Fleuve, Joseph Galliéni.
There were no funds to hire workers, so Galliéni, “an innovator,” used prisoners of war and
refugees from the French conquest campaigns. He also greatly exploited the villages du
liberté, liberty villages, which cropped up near military camps on the supply route and
railroad between Kayes and Bamako as runaway slaves sought work as well as protection
from their former masters. Most of the inhabitants in liberty villages at this time were
refugees from the French wars with Ahmadou Tall and Samori Touré. There were 6,000
people “delivered” to liberty villages over two years in the Soudan. 25 Liberty villages, which
developed due to colonial conflict and the French “humanitarianism” that sought to end
slavery in Africa (abolition was also one of the justifications for colonialism in the first
place), actually became centers of coercion, where ex-slaves and refugees were forced to
work for the colonial state. The colonial mission civilisatrice, which preached a “noble”
rhetoric, was in actuality the way that the colonial administration was able to forcibly extract
23
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labor and goods from the colonies. The words did not match up with the reality.
Kayes-Niger construction occurred after the rainy season, in November and December
when the harvest was over and the ground was firm enough for heavy transportation. After
January, temperatures began to rise, along with the death rate of laborers. Workers usually
left in May or June to plant their crops for the rainy season cultivation period. Under these
conditions, the military reported having “difficulty…recruiting and retaining” labor. It was a
“construction site that was consistently understaffed by men who needed constant supervision
to prevent desertion.” 26 Resistance followed right behind coercion, both intentionally to avoid
hard work and the loss of liberty and because Senegalese and Malian rail laborers had a work
obligation that was more important: feeding their families with the crops planted in the rainy
season. Galliéni use of forced labor for railroad construction launched such coercion “on an
unprecedented scale [in] the Soudan.” Earlier forced porterage on the supply route to the
Soudan had been hard but short work, with a lower death and injury rate. There was not
much interest in working the railroad, so both recruitment and retention of recruits were very
unsuccessful, especially when there was no budget for wages. Coercion became the order of
the day, and the French campaigns against the Tukolor and Samorian empires created a “flood
of refugees” that were “easier to control” in their desperation. 27 At the end of construction,
Galliéni got a promotion, despite outstandingly shoddy work: railroad ties were not termite
resistant, ties were placed as far as two meters apart (twice the recommended distance) and
were too thin, and bridges and culverts did not drain well during the rainy season. 28 The
Gouvernement Général in 1931 wrote that Galliéni’s work “had nothing of a railroad except
for a name (n'avait d'un chemin de fer que le nom).” 29 The budgetary concerns that plagued
the rail from the beginning obliged colons to instate the quickest, cheapest, and dirtiest forms
of labor and construction: work had to be forced and whatever could be built was acceptable.
In the long run, however, this probably cost the colonial administration more money, since
renovations had to be done. As in future endeavors, in trying to save money or to get around
financial constraints, the French colonial government ended up losing. In the 1940s, the
financial bind of the railroad would lead the rail administration to keep wages and conditions
poor, and the strike that followed in 1947 would end up costing the government and the rail
more money than simple wage hikes.
Two survey groups were sent out in 1892-1893, demonstrating the lesson learned from the
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first construction stage, when work started with no survey teams or planning. The 1931
colonial publication implies that there was often an indigène work team, but there is never a
mention of how those indigenes were “recruited”: even their origins are unclear. After one of
the missions returned, the Comité des Travaux Publics in July granted a budget of 76,000
francs per kilometer. The Comité also “stated with regret that the results were not acquired
without the price of a cruel sacrifice in men, the mission having seen 2 officers, 4 noncommissioned officers or soldiers die, out of a personnel of 4 officers and 20 men (constate en
outre, avec regret, ce qui n'ont été acquis qu'au prix de cruels sacrifices en hommes, la
mission ayant vu mourir 2 officiers, 4 sous-officiers ou soldats sur un personnel de 4 officiers
et 20 hommes).” 30 There is no mention in the 1931 publication of how many Africans may
have also died.
Under Captain Klobb, a team improved existing track, with 966 Africans, 826 in unskilled
labor (422 are forced and 404 are volunteers), 20 foremen, 3 interpreters, and 84 Africans
“deemed” skilled by Klobb. Albert Grodet, first civilian governor of the Upper Senegal
Valley, December 1893, opened the Kayes-Bamako railroad for private use on January 1,
1894, which made French commercial interests and the government more enthusiastic about
the venture. The Bafing River Bridge was completed in 1896, and steam could now be used
to get construction materials to the East. 31 The bridge was inaugurated in May of 1896, after
eight years of delay at the river. “This event reanimated confidence and marked a revival of
opinion in favor of the Kayes-Niger (Cet événément ramina la confiance et marqua un
revirement d'opinion en faveur du Kayes-Niger),” according to the Gouvernement Général de
l'AOF in 1931. 32 Once the government felt confident that the railroad would begin to pay for
itself, financial interest resumed. On this set of renovations, skilled African labor was used,
which set a precedent for colonial labor practices.
The railroad project was then given to the Cinquième Regiment du Génie (military
engineers), who had previous railroad construction experience. 33 In 1898, the Département
des Colonies approved the proposal written by the Direction du Chemin de Fer to build 40-50
kilometers of track a year, with work projected to end in 1906 at a budget of 24,719,000
francs. The 1931 administration publication mentioned that a yellow fever epidemic in 1900
delayed work, and the worsening of the epidemic in 1901 and “took numerous victims in the
ranks of the European personnel in charge of work supervision (fit de nombreuses victimes
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dans les rangs du personnel européens chargé de la surveillance des travaux).” 34 Once again,
there was no mention of casualties among African forced and volunteer laborers.
African labor increased fivefold from 1,091 to almost 5,000 over the building period from
1898-1904. At the time, the liberty village populations were very high, showing an increase
from 4,000 to 10,000, which was partly augmented by an economic disaster after Samori
Touré’s defeat in 1898 and the Sahelian famine of 1902-1903. These workers were laid off in
1904 following the completion of the project, and they “joined a large population of displaced
Africans who already lived near the rail line.” 35 The 1931 colonial publication praised the
success of construction: “These results greatly added to the glory of the officers and engineers
of the Engineering Corps. They dearly paid for [the results] by the loss of a large number
among them who are now resting beside the magnificent work that passes on to the younger
generations their imperishable memory (Ces résultats ajoutent grandement a la gloire des
officiers et sapeurs du Génie. Ils l'ont d'ailleurs cherément payée par la perte d'une grande
nombre d'entre eux reposant a côté de l'oeuvre magnifique qui transmet aux jeunes
générations leur imperissable souvenir).” 36 The sacrifice of the Africans working under the
corps of engineers was completely ignored. James Jones pointed out that the Kayes-Niger
was completed “20 years late and 40 million francs over budget.” 37 Colonial ideology did not
match up with colonial practice, and colonial memory, similarly, did not match up to the
historical record. Like Galliéni, who advanced despite his poor work, the construction of the
railroad itself, glorified by the French government, was actually a series of failures that finally
got somewhere. It was a financial disaster, and the French taxpayers footed the bill. This
pattern of propoganda would continue to mask the reality “on the ground” in AOF.
In 1904, the Kayes-Niger say 1904 saw an “immediate increase in French economic
activity.” Commercial firms opened branches in Bamako, where the whites ran the shops and
the Africans loaded and unloaded goods into the wharehouses. Heavy materials could now be
delivered to the Niger as well, and Bamako became the capital of the Soudan. From 1902 to
1907, the population of Bamako grew from 3,800 to 6,000. 38 This growth was only the first
to manifest the economic powerhouse that the railroad would become.

By 1905, all

circulating trains were running at expected capacity. From January 1, 1893, traffic increased
on a whole on the Kayes-Niger, except during the yellow fever epidemic. Operation revenues
34

Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, 17.
Jones, 17-18.
36
Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, 20.
37
Jones, 20.
38
Jones, 21.
35

18
increased from 130,000 francs in 1893 to 2,700,000 francs in 1905. In 1893, there were
33,000 passengers and in 1904, 61,000. Between 1897 and 1904, tons of merchandise
increased from 6,963 to 294,396 tons. Merchandise revenue increased from 164,087 francs
to 1,564,463 francs. 39 In 1905, the train personnel included African workers as mechanics,
train and station chiefs, conductors, and other workers. As reported by the government in
1931: “The training of mechanics was difficult. With tenacity, they were able to suitably
instruct, in 1905, twenty or so mechanics and as many conductors. (La formation des
méchaniciens a été difficile. Avec de la tenacité, on était parvenu à instruire convenablement,
en 1905, une vigntaine de méchaniciens et autant de chauffeurs…).” 40 Africans were in
skilled jobs, finally trusted to complete their tasks. They were put in charge of operating the
huge machine that would churn out huge revenues for France and change the face of labor in
the AOF colonies.
Wage labor became a reality and started to develop, though not set, in the colonial mind as
a way to control and “civilize.” The railroad completion “greatly expanded the market for
wage labor in the interior,” according to James Jones. Since importation was easier, more
French moved into the interior and prices dropped, in turn meaning that better censuses could
be implemented and enterprises were more easily started up, which in turn meant that because
everyone could be accounted for, tax collection was better, and since start-up costs lessened,
there were more trading opportunities. Both of these factors were enticements to enter the
wage system—since taxes and enterprises had to be paid for in cash. 41 The railroad was no
longer just an economic endeavor, it was a tool for the mission civilisatrice.
Labor recruitment was problematic in the first half of the 20th Century. This was due to
low wages, the social stigma associated with manual labor, “its unfamiliarity to Africans,”
and the simple fact that working the line meant increased contact with Europeans. A study in
Guinea from 1900-1914 concluded that most laborers were conscripted, malnourished,
mistreated, and poorly paid. The Thiès-Niger’s conditions were similar, except that there
were more choices in terms of labor, such as porterage and other unskilled work that created
“competition” with the railroad. A 1912 report studying why Africans did not volunteer for
rail work found that it was the work itself: 95% of the work allocated to Africans was hard,
physical labor such as grading (which James Jones terms “moving dirt”), or digging up ballast
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(rocks), which were put between the ties. 42 The French did not buy machines to aid workers
or save time, and the most demanding work went to Africans. In these conditions, forced
labor was the easiest way to get workers. By 1912, there was “strong political and ideological
support [in France]…for forced labor [...].” General Charles Mangin supported forced labor
as a tool to “civilize” African soldiers and to give the French a greater number of disciplined
troops in case of another war with Germany. The Ministre des Colonies authorized the use of
forced labor in 1912. There were 1,560 conscripts by the end of 1912, and penal labor was
also permitted for construction and public route maintenance in AOF. 43 Thus, conscription
became the official French policy, all in the name of forcing Senegalese and other West
Africans to do the labor that the French would not have done for wages, to save money, to
impose French mores on African “recruits, and to build up the military aspect of the Empire.
Forced labor was a many-faceted practice, but it also forced Africans to come into contact
with Europeans, and these contacts, which would deepen as Africans moved into the wage
labor system and out of the forced labor one, gave workers their first taste of the equality and
civil rights that they would be promised in subsequent years.
The Thiès-Kayes line was constructed from 1907-1923. In an overview of preliminary
work being done on the Thiès-Kayes, the 1931 publication mentions that the camels used to
cross the desert near the Saloum Delta in Senegal were fatigued by their labors 44 but neglects
to include the state of the Africans involved in the survey work. In 1912, budget cuts from
the Chamber of Deputies meant that the majority of Tukolor work force had to be fired. 150
workers were left at the end of the firings, 45 meaning that 90% of the workers were laid off,
many of whom had been with the line for “many years (plusieurs années).” They were
replaced with “requisitioned (réquisitionnée)” workers who, “despite the efforts of the
European personnel, could never replace the dedicated and loyal Tukolor volunteers sent back
to their village by unforeseeable unemployment.

This was the origin of all the

disappointments in the years following (malgré les efforts du personnel européen, ne put
jamais remplacer les volontaires toucouleurs dévoués et fidèle que ce chômage imprévisible
avait rendus à leur village. C’est là l’origine de tous les mécomptes des années à venir).” 46
Interestingly enough, the government blamed the “disappointments” of the following years on
forced laborers, which seems, to some extent, to criticize forced labor as a practice. The
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immediate layoffs of workers, which, as in 1904 did not seem to bother officials at the time,
would also remain a strong pattern over the years, as labor in the colonies was seen as easily
dispensable, with no consequences for poor treatment. This assumption underestimated the
power of the Senegalese, Malian, and other railroad labor that would strike time and again
over bad working conditions, layoffs, and low salaries.
At WWI (1914), personnel were sent back overseas for the war effort, though the origins
of this personnel are not specified, and much of the train construction and operation materiel
was sent back to France for the war effort. This meant that construction and operation
stopped on the line. The train line that opened in Sinthiou-Malène in 1915 allowed tirailleurs
recruited from the Soudan to be sent to the war in Europe. 47 There was an “acute labor
shortage” at the war due to, according to officials, Africans’ attempts to avoid military
service. This makes some sense, since the recruits were “treated like prisoners of war” in at
least one incident. 48 Once again, colonized people were forced to contribute to a system that
offered them nothing other than words: the promises of benefits, the high poetry of glory, and
the language of inclusion, which were used to ship them off to war.

Desertions and

recruitment dodging were early forms of resistance to colonial labor practices, and these
individual work moratoriums would broaden and unite in later years to true strikes.
The railroad was more than a change in the Senegalese and Soudanese physical landscape:
it vastly altered the social, political, and economic landscapes of both regions. Marx wrote
that the role of the railroad in the global expansion of capitalism was as the “principal factor
of economic submission, bringing about the surpassing of a strictly political solution [to
expansion] (agent principal de la soumission économique, traduisant le dépassement de la
solution strictement politique).” 49 The colonial export economy was established only with the
advent of the rail. The export economy, or la traite, was meant to drain goods from the
interior. The railroad was the “pièce de maîtrise (controlling component)” for the export
economy and the center of French investments. In 1907, the colonial administration was
allocated 100 million francs for export infrastructure, 78.5% of which went to railroad
infrastructure. As in the rest of the colonies, Senegal and the Soudan were submitted to “the
politics of specialization (la politique de spécialisation),” in which each colony was
designated as the producer of the single product that best suited the region’s agricultural
conditions. For Senegal, it was peanuts, and each kilometer of rail sustained an export
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production of 300 tons of peanuts. 50 According to James Jones, “When Europeans invested in
colonial industrialization, they only did so to facilitate the export of raw materials by
improving storage and shipment [...].” 51 The Dakar-Niger, intended initially as a supply route
for the military conquest of the Niger Valley, became the “largest industrial enterprise” in
AOF and the “umbilical cord” to the interior. Despite its role in military conquest, the line
was initially meant to be a “tool for social and economic development.” The railroad did
stimulate “some local labor,” but “the main thing that the railroad consumed in Africa was
labor.” 52

The railroad created the conditions for the export economy, and despite the

crippling effect this system would have on the colonies well past independence, it was a very
fragile endeavor, one that could easily be stopped up. The railroad, the power source for the
colonial administration, was also an exposed area, and threats to that source would allow
Africans to stand up to the French.
The birth of the railroad came just after the birth of “high colonialism” for the French
empire. It was, conveniently, a tool for social “development,” political control, and economic
exploitation.

Colonial rhetoric around the railroad made many promises to the French

administration, the metropolitan citizens, and colonial subjects, but it was little more than men
with guns coercing Africans to work. These forced laborers did not take long to resist those
that were exploiting them, however, and the railroad is inextricably linked to a long history of
conflict that takes every form imaginable. In its conception, the railroad, to a certain extent,
created the conditions that would bring about strong challenges to the colonial administration
and presented Africans with a way to claim agency over their own lives, to resist. The
connections that the railroad would forge among Senegalese and Malians, among West
African peoples, simply in its tying together of different regions by a train, would create an
even strong unification.

The Inter-War Period: A New French Philosophy and the First Strikes
The end of WWI brought an increased level of colonial intervention in the colonies,
but it also saw an increase in labor agitation. As Abdoulaye Cissé, an informant interviewed
in Dakar, said: “Chaque fois qu’il y a une guerre…après [il y a] toujours des événements
(Every time there is war…afterwards there are events).” 53 The Interwar period proved this
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statement too true, ringing in a series of cheminot strikes that would begin to challenge their
treatment in the colonial system.
After the war, forced labor and resistance to it continued. Resistance took many
forms, from outright desertion to theft, work delays, sabotage, feigned sickness, and “target
work” (making enough for a specific objective and then quitting).54 Work started again in
1920, and 7,000 laborers worked for the line, including volunteer and skilled labor. In 1922,
there were 8,000 laborers, most of which were Africans managed by military supervision. 55
The number of travelers on the Thiès-Kayes increased from 1910-1923, from 130,025 to
447,583, according to the 1931 report, because “The indigène loves to travel (L’indigène aime
voyager…).” 56 1920 mid-January to mid-November, there were 1,000 workers on the ThièsKayes. 241 deserted, 31 on a single day, 26 deserted twice. There were 896 forced workers
on the Thiès-Niger in 1925, and 312 of them deserted in the last five months. 57 Fear of death
and disease made desertions increase, worsened by the numerous epidemics that hit the line.
Albert Londres, a French writer, who traveled to West Africa in the 1920s wrote that labor
recruitment had “depopulated the West African federation,” estimating that nearly 600,000
French West Africans had moved to the Gold Coast, 2 million to Nigeria, and 10,000 Ivorians
had moved from their villages into the forest. Londres said that the “psychological impact” of
forced labor meant that whites were associated with “government” and “nightmare.” To
reduce the African resistance to forced labor, the French improved compensation, increasing
and improving rations, raising wages, and also increasing punishments. 58 These forms of
resistance, however, were coupled with unified labor resistance in the form of strikes. The
deep impact that forced and wage labor had on West Africa could be seen in the massive
movement of peoples out of affected areas or into cities, the latter establishing circumstances
that would lead to population concentrations of laborers. These concentrations facilitated
unification and solidarity.
In 1919, the cheminots, African and European alike, sent a telegram to the Direction du
Réseau (the management), demanding higher wages to offset the rising cost of living after
WWI and the end of bad treatment. They threatened a 24-hour strike for April 12th. The
Direction responded with “intimidation and repression (l’intimidation et la repression),” by
calling for over a hundred tirailleurs to patrol train stations. Workers responded in turn by
54

Jones, 28.
Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, 48-49.
56
Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, 57.
57
Jones, 28.
58
Jones, 30-31.
55

23
dispersing all over the country so that their strike could occur, which it did on April 13th. The
Europeans went back to work on the 14th, and the African workers followed on the 16th, once
the essential demands had been met. This was, for the labor movement, “its first big victory
(sa première grande victoire),” but there was a growing frustration with European workers
who broke with the African strikers and also got even higher wage hikes. 59 This was one of
the last times African and European workers would strike together, and the divisions between
them would grow to the point that European equated management and establishment. At the
strike of 1947, leader Ibrahima Sarr even had to express that the strike was not anti-white, it
was the racial hierarchy of the workplace that forced African workers to go up against their
French bosses. 60
The Thiès-Niger, which after subsequent extensions became known as the DakarNiger, was fused on August 15, 1923. Problems with different gauges between the ThièsKayes and the Kayes-Niger, equipment and personnel shortages on the line made the line at
first unsuccessful for material evacuation.61

Service was irregular, there were thefts, “the

integrity of certain workers was lowered (la conscience de certains agents baissa),” and the
commercial litigation ensuing from delays and financial losses led to monetary damage for the
line. In 1925, a reorganization of the line was called for to deal with the glitches. 62 This
reorganization included security increases to stop thefts, according to the 1931 publication,
but this could have also been due to the strike of 1925, as a repressive measure. Trains and
car numbers were also upped, and station and service buildings were constructed, repaired,
and upgraded. 63 Once again, poor colonial planning initially led to a greater expenditure of
metropolitan taxes.
The Kayes-Niger goods and passenger traffic increased, and to address the need for
labor, the French imported workers. This led to problems in 1924 and a strike in 1925.
Resentment was increased as efficiency measures, such as eliminating the morning break,
were put into place. 64 Workers were imported from Spain, Italy, and Algeria in 1924, though
the administration reports referred to them collectively as “Moroccans.” They created more
tension in the workplace, such as one incident where a manager told a sub-Saharan worker,
"In Morocco, natives don't get to speak. Here, I am in charge, and you, sale nègre, shut your
mouth." Thus began a series of attacks against the new managers, the imprisonment of
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attackers, and a strike on the Dakar-Saint Louis line the next year, followed by other strikes in
different sectors. 1925 became “known as the year of grands grèves.” 65 The 1931 colonial
publication noted the labor agitation in 1924 and 1925:
In fact, from the end of 1924, a certain agitation manifested itself
among the Thiès-Niger workers, who demanded a readjustment of their
renumerations to the cost, ever rising, of life. Promises were made and the
preparation of pay was under study, but it did not advance quickly enough
for the liking of the agents who manifested a feverish impatience and a
noticeably bad spirit (En fait, dès la fin de 1924, une certain effervescence
se manifesta parmi les agents du Thiès-Niger qui réclamaient un
réajustement de leurs émouluments au coût, sans cesse croissant, de la vie.
Des promesses avaient été faites et la préparation des nouvelles soldes
était à l'étude mais elle n'avançait pas assez vite au gré des agents qui
mainfestèrent une impatience fébrile et un mauvais esprit très net).66
As in 1919, the strikes on the Dakar-Saint Louis line in 1925 deliberately coincided
with the largest period of export. The Chamber of Commerce responded by chiding the rail
direction, charging that if the administration had been more conciliatory and cooperative, the
strike could have been avoided. The president of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce also said
that there had already been an approved decision to raise wages, and that it was the fault of
bureaucratic delays in the Métropole. 67 The administration then had meetings with "various
African notables" but no workers, and decrees in October of 1925 and March of 1926 altered
salaries, conditions, and hours. 68 The railroad, which had now become the center of France’s
colonial “stratégie économique,” was extremely sensitive to strikes and sabotage. The swift
action on the part of the Chamber of Commerce in both 1919 and 1925 illustrates the
importance that the railroad had gained in the French economy. 69 The way in which these
early strikes were dealt with poses an interesting contradiction: though the rail direction was
often supported by the colonial administration in an initial use of intimidation and repression,
they ultimately gave into workers’ demands and commercial pressure. 70 This pattern of
behavior led to a bloody end to the strike of 1938 as well as communicated to workers that
their actions could achieve progress in the workplace, especially when that action threatened
metropolitan interests.
It was illegal for Africans to unionize until 1937, but cadre members with professional
school diplomas could form associations amicales, and the railroad formed the Association
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amicale professionnelle des Agents du Chemin de fer du Thiès-Niger in 1925.

The

administration treated the cadre workers as the representatives of all African rail workers. 71
The amicale could not call strikes or negotiate contracts, but it did train labor leaders, collect
dues, and offer the administration a way to spy on workers through police informants planted
at meetings. François Gning was elected and served for 17 years as secretary-general and
spokesman for the cheminots. Gning was an évolué who worked from age 18 on the railroad
as an accountant. He was wounded in WWI, and was an active member in the Socialist Party
(which was under the leadership of Lamine Guèye). 72 Thus, the cheminot labor movement
entered a new stage: that of legal organization, even if an amicale was not technically a union.
The railroad would witness many of the first and most bitter strikes in AOF, and the
leadership of the amicale would play a role in union action (or lack thereof) past the strike of
1947.
From the end of the 19th Century to the 1920s, French colonial thinking evolved from
thinking that Africans had “primitive brains” incapable of more than agricultural work to
establishing technical schools and offering them employment in skilled jobs. These jobs had
good salaries, were long term, and had good conditions because the French wanted to retain
them. The colonial administration began to use Africans in non-construction jobs because of
the economic constraints from the Métropole: they could pay Africans lower wages and did
not have to pay transportation fees for foreign workers, plus Africans could, in theory, better
stand the climate, while European numbers dropped dramatically due to illness. 73

The

differences between African construction and African skilled labor, however, were great.
Railroad towns like Thiès received discounted goods, and skilled operators received free and
discounted train tickets every year. There was also a food cooperative set up in Thiès for
operators. 74 This move toward placing West Africans in skilled jobs set about enforcing two
colonial phenomena. The first was working as cheaply as possible, and since colonized West
Africans did not have the same rights as Europeans, they were put into skilled labor. The
second employed the theory that work could make the colonized “evolve,” and those who
worked within the system, such as François Gning, would be rewarded with support and
power. This attitude led to nascent divisions between those who assimilated to French ideals
and ways and those who did not, or could not.
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The technical schools set up to train African workers also set up another division
among the cheminots: that of job status. The first of these was the Compagnie indigène de
sapeurs des chemins de fer in Bamako in the fall of 1925. Recruits came from all over the
AOF for a three-year service, where they were trained militarily and as rail workers in
different capacities. 75 These schools “legitimized the use of educational qualifications to
stratify the railroad workforce.” Decrees on the 7th and 12th of March, 1925 put African
operating employees in the cadre commun and Europeans in the cadre commun supérieur.
When the first graduates exited the technical schools, a third cadre, the cadre locale
secondaire, was created for Africans with advanced technical training, such as scribes, station
chiefs, telegraph operators, and signal men. The cadre local supérieur included Africans who
had completed technical apprenticeships, such as foremen and supervisors.

The cadre

commun supérieur was made up of African workers (mostly accounting clerks) and European
employees.

The majority of African workers, however, were auxiliaries, who had no

contracts and were hired on a day-to-day basis. In 1926, the cadre commun supérieur earned
3,000-11,000 francs a month. The cadre locale secondaire earned 1,700 to 3,000 francs a
month. Auxiliaries earned less than 100 francs a month. 76 Thus race became institutionalized
as the basis of hierarchy. Those chosen few évolués would graduate technical schools and
move into the mid- to high-level cadres while Europeans reserved the top, best paying jobs.
Those relegated to the bottom were cursed with precarious employ, low wages, and no rights.
Over the next decade, labor activity was relatively calm, nipped in the bud by reforms
for specific grievances and also “by the collusion of African labor leaders whose privileged
position at a time of economic depression gave them a stake in maintaining the status quo.” 77
In the 1930s, the Great Depression was strongly felt all over AOF, and 1933 was an especially
difficult year in Senegal. Workers wanted job protection and security, so they were less
interested in union organizing. 78

The Depression also served to further disconnect skilled

African labor from unskilled and from Europeans as well. Skilled African workers were
protected even over European workers, who were laid off along with unskilled African
workers to compensate for the price dip in colonial exports. African professionals were
protected because they earned less than Europeans in equivalent jobs, which saved the
colonial administration money. They were given more responsibilities and were viewed as

75

Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, 103.
Jones, 45.
77
Jones, 51.
78
Sene, 26.
76

27
privileged. 79 Skilled African labor was an investment—one that required recruitment and
training. Since this investment was cheaper than European labor, skilled laborers gained more
advantages than their unskilled comrades and even, to some extent, their European
counterparts. This furthered their importance to the railroad, which increased their clout, as it
distanced them from their fellow workers, Europeans because of race and Africans because of
job status and rights.
A new government took power in France in 1936, and the ruling party, the Front
Populaire, was socialist in ideology. The Front Populaire legalized unions in the colonies in
1937, and union activity was revitalized. The limits for union affiliation, however, included
an educational cutoff, meaning that only “those that could fluently speak, read, and write
French (ceux qui savaient parler, lire, et écrire couramment le français),” 80 and who held a
certificat d’études primaires could join unions. 81

Those excluded by this restriction,

however, could form associations amicales. Marius Moutet, Minister of the Colonies and the
father of the decree, was an assimilationist. He wanted Africans to be encouraged to learn
French, hence the restrictions, according to Mor Sene. In 1937 there were 119 associations, 42
of which were official unions. 82 As before, the cadre agents, who had educational degrees
from the technical schools that trained them, were allowed to speak for all of the cheminots,
though the majority of African workers were relegated to auxiliary status and had no rights.
This division would only worsen, culminating in the 1938 strike in Thiès.

The Front

Populaire seemed to promise rights and opportunities for its colonies, but in reality, it merely
strengthened the racialized system that had been instated in the first stages of construction on
the railroad.
The socialist government under the Front Populaire considered “African workers, and
even strikers…as an integral part of normalized society (les travailleurs africains, et même les
grèvistes…comme partie intégrante de la société normalisée).” 83 Marius Moutet illustrated
the new contradictory philosophy of the Front Populaire when he said in 1937: “We have no
interest in developing wage labor. We must on the contrary permit populations to cultivate
their own land (Nous n'avons aucun interêt à développer le travail salarié. Nous devons au
contraire permettre aux populations de cultiver leurs propres terres).” 84
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legislation that seemed to encourage industrialization or wage labor, the French
administration still held onto the belief of the African peasant, who was tied to the land and
interested only in farming. This even seemed to be a preferred alternative to the striking wage
laborer. The Front Populaire seemed to give hope for colonial reforms for “the maximum of
social justice and human possibilities (le maximum de justice sociale et de possibilités
humaines),” 85 but it continually fell short of its philosophies and its promises.
Further divisions between the elite cadre and the auxiliaries were broadened with
Front Populaire political actions. Marcel DeCoppet, governor of AOF, wanted to plant the
seeds of socialism in Africa. In so doing, he encouraged pro-Front Populaire groups to accept
the membership of “Africains cultivés” and in Senegal particularly,
a series of very original alliances formed: the socialist mayor of
Dakar, Lamine Guèye, and his unionist friends [such as Gning] became
the de facto allies of the governor of AOF while the deputy Galandou
Diouf, the mayor’s rival, formed intrigues with certain anti-Front
Populaire dealers as well as with certain groups of Africans rejected by
their socialist ‘comrades’ (une série d'alliances assez originales se
constituèrent: le maire socialiste de Dakar, Lamine Guèye, et ses amis
syndicalistes devinrent des alliés de fait du gouverneur général de l'AOF
alors que le député Galandou Diouf, rival du maire, nouait des intrigues
aussi bien avec les milieux d'affaires anti-Front Populaires qu'avec certains
groupes d'Africains rejetés par leur ‘camarades’ socialistes). 86
Politicians and politics entered the union scene, either for or against the auxiliaries that had
been pushed aside by cadre agents, who looked to their own interests in their union under
Gning. Ten years before the strike of 1947, Lamine Guèye had already marked his position as
with the administration and against the welfare of many workers, a position that he would
maintain through WWII and the strikes of 1946 and 1947. Meanwhile, rival politicians
attempted to form alliances with those left out of the range of colonial support, another theme
that would repeat following the strike of 1947, when Senghor pulled the cheminots into his
new party in 1949. The cheminots could not stay clear of politics and politicians, no matter
how hard they tried to preserve autonomy, and whether or not they officially affiliated with a
party, they still felt the pull of politics. These alliances and divisions would harden into the
conflict that was the strike of 1938 and further define the establishment elites as separate and
more favored by the colonial administration than the voiceless, though not powerless,
auxiliaries.
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Once unions were allowed in 1937 for educated workers, the cheminot association
became a union under Gning, who told the Governor-General that auxiliaries should not be
allowed into the union because they could develop a "too violent conception of union action."
The auxiliaries began to meet separately from the cadre union, 87 since they felt that the union
did not take their needs into account and Gning opposed all attempts to revitalize action for
labor improvements. A call for a schism was started in Dakar, and discussions continued in
Thiès. 88 The administration, nervous over the meetings, transferred one of the auxiliary
leaders, Cheikh Diack, from Thiès to another station on September 15. On September 27,
1938, auxiliaries blocked the rail line at Thiès in protest. Troops were called in and six
strikers were killed. Twenty-two soldiers were put on trial but their cases “disappeared” a
few months later. Governor-General de Coppet was dismissed, as well as the railroad director
and his assistant. The new director ignored the strike settlement of September 29, and by
May 1939, 71 strikers were arrested and many of them were thrown into jail. 89 The 1938
strike was a defining moment in the cheminot labor movement. First, it showed how far the
administration would go to stop strikes and how far it could go without too many
consequences. It also proved that auxiliaries without a union could still challenge the colonial
system: unions did not necessarily have a monopoly on organized protest, especially in
conditions where workers lived in a close-knit community that was further united by its
alienation from the norm. The strikers of 1947 most likely had the 1938 strike in mind when
they prepared for their action, and Sarr’s calls for peace and calm, which are recorded in
police files on Sarr at the ANS, 90 could have been a reaction to the 1938 strike: since the
colonial administration could have strikers shot, especially if they were considered to be
violent, it was better to be as peaceful as possible. The 1947 strikers also may have realized
that the key to a successful strike was the unification of cadre and auxiliary, which would
bring together the educated elite, whose power lay in their ties to other elites and even the
administration, and the raw power of numbers that the auxiliaries brought.
A decree in 1939 reiterated the status of permanent and temporary labor: permanent
workers were defined as the cadre agents and auxiliaries, temporary workers were journaliers,
who were recruited for high-activity periods.

The cadres were split into the cadre du

personnel supérieur, which had four advancement levels and included administration and
management positions.
87
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European. Next was the cadre commun supérieur, which included inspection personnel,
mostly Europeans with “some (quelques)” évolués. The benefits were similar to those of the
cadre du personnel supérieur, but these benefits were especially better for European workers.
Next came the cadre secondaire, which had seven advancement levels and was made up of
agents advancing from the cadre local, which had two designations, the cadre local
secondaire and the cadre local supérieur. This cadre was made up of technical school
graduates. All cadre agents had job security, a set salary, a fixed and clarified way to
advance, and sick days. 91
Auxiliaries were “the crushing majority (l’écrasante majorité)” and had five stages of
advancement. Auxiliaries had no guaranteed housing, and those who were housed lived in
camps.

They had no rights as workers and were easily fired.

In Thiès, out of 1,975

cheminots, 1,600 were auxiliaries. According to Abdoulaye Ba, interviewed by Mor Sene,
“An auxiliary who lost a parent in the morning had to go back to work in the
afternoon…During work hours, an auxiliary who needed to relieve himself had to ask
permission for a five-minute break. One minute extra exposed him to sanctions (Un auxiliaire
qui perdait un parent le matin, devait reprendre le travail l’après-midi…Durant les heures du
travail, un auxiliaire qui sentait le besoin de se soulager devait demander une permission de
cinq minutes. Une minute de plus l’exposait à des sanctions).” One of the only benefits to
the auxiliaries’ situation was that, like most African cheminots, they lived in concentrated
areas and worked close together in their places of work. The concentration of workers
“resulted in forging in the breast of this proletariat a class conscience that went beyond ethnic
or other differences (avait fini par forger au sein de ce prolétariat une conscience de classe
par-dessus les différences ethniques ou autres).” 92 The obvious privilege of European and
select Africans carried on the racialized labor system that the colonial administration wanted
in order to keep Europeans in ruling positions and Africans in subservient ones. Although
colonial and French rhetoric would later suggest that West Africans and the French should be
regarded as equal, the reality was that the colons and the Métropole bought into
discriminatory practices and hierarchical theories surrounding race. This disparity would
become the center of cheminot demands for equal pay and treatment, since they cut right to
the heart of colonial duplicity.
At the end of the 1930s, three factors contributed to the beginnings of “true (vrais)”
unions in francophone Africa. First, as an AOF proletariat began to form and expand, the
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administration shied away from angering a population that could disrupt the social order and
colonial presence. Second, a minority of metropolitan citizens, mostly unionists and Front
Populaire progressivists, wanted to encourage social progress in the colonies. There were
also members or sympathizers of the Séction française de l’Internationale ouvrière (SFIO) or
the Parti communiste français (PCF) in the colonial administration.

Third, overseas

commercial and financial interests were worried enough about the “menace of anarchy
(menace d’anarchie)” from unions that they were willing to begrudge some workers’ rights,
under strictly-controlled conditions. 93

The conditions of work for cadre agents and

auxiliaries also contributed to the nascent labor movement that enveloped the cheminots, and
they “adopted the structures, tactics, and ideals of the French labor movement.” 94
Furthermore, the status of skilled laborers allowed them to connect with the bourgeois
population, 95 which had both an up and a down side. The elite workers were capable of
turning their backs on their auxiliary compatriots, illustrated by the strike of 1938 or any of
Gning’s refusals to act against the colonial system, but it also gave them access to the French
structures and rhetoric that would eventually lead to the strike of 1947-1948, which was run
for the most part by the technical school-graduate elite, united auxiliary with cadre, and used
the rhetoric of the French Republic and colonialism to underline the inherent hypocrisies of
both. The importance of the elite technicians can be summed up in this: in Kayes as of 2002,
when a male child is born, he is blessed with “Allaou ma keta sefou de garrou di, (May Allah
make him become the station master [chef du gare]).” 96 These higher-cadre agents brought
happiness to their families and enjoyed an immense amount of power, which was used both
for and against the other Africans with whom they worked. Despite the union’s inaction in
1938, the railroad union was one of the most active in the 1936-1938 period. 97 Although
conditions would change with the coming of the war, driving the union closer to the
confrontation that became the strike of 1947-1948, many of the roots of that strike were
firmly planted in the interwar period. This pattern, in fact, was replicated all over colonized
Africa, as class conscience was born and developed among the populations pushed into the
wage labor system.

WWII: Colonialism and Labor under Vichy and Free France
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The war brought many changes to the colonial system, as Africans were called upon to
sacrifice as much, if not more, than their French “brothers,” whether they were of Vichy or
Free French sympathies. The labor movement suffered under both regimes during the war,
with one restricting almost as much as the other. The only difference was that once AOF was
“liberated” from Vichy and joined Free France, the colonized pointed to the rhetoric that the
Allied Forces and France employed to differentiate themselves from the fascism of the Axis
powers and asked that it actually be extended to them as well. The use of colonial rhetoric to
demand change crystallized as a tactic in this era.
At the fall of France to Germany in 1940, AOF joined the Vichy government, while
l'Afrique Equatoriale Français (AEF) remained with Free France. Along with several other
actions that suppressed civil liberties, Vichy illegalized union organizing. 98 In Dakar, the
Vichy governor general, Pierre Boisson, increased the use of forced labor to continue the
export economy’s flow of raw materials out of the colonies. Since the export economy
required manufactured goods to be imported to continue export, and there were no
manufactured goods being shipped from war-torn Europe, forced labor was the chosen option
to continue sending supplies to the Métropole. The levels of forced labor were so high, in
fact, that even Boisson feared a “désastre (disaster).” 99 The Vichy policy stated that Africans
had to be “submitted to ‘the obligation of work’ and in exchange [would] benefit from decent
salaries, good work conditions, and the ability to have their families come to their places of
work (soumis à ‘l’obligation de travail’ et en échange bénéficier de salaires décents, de
bonnes conditions du travail, et de pouvoir faire venir leurs familles sur leurs lieux de
travail).” In reality, this plan only continued the practice of forced labor in AOF, instead of
fulfilling the Vichy colonial capitalist ideology, which was stated by Bertrand Mounier, a
Vichy theorist, as the action of “attaching little by little the indigène to his job, to give him a
sense of professionalism, to fill him with the mystique of work and progress…so that no one
could escape from the obligations of work (d’attacher peu à peu l’indigène à son métier, de lui
donner le sens de la profession, de lui insuffler une mystique de travail et du progress…que
personne ne pourra échapper aux obligations du travail).” 100 During the war, the export
economy once again demonstrated its weakness: it needed input for output, and when the
imports stopped, so too did the entire economy. Furthermore, forced labor came back in full
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force, though it had not disappeared in the interwar period. The idea of work as a positive
phenomenon that would discipline and civilize colonial subjects was not a new idea but rather
one that reflected the colonial opinion that all Africans wanted to work just to sustain
themselves, just to survive, and that they were incapable of European work. This sentiment
would not disappear with the advent of the Free French, and neither would forced labor or
repression.
In 1942, AOF joined Free France, and forced labor continued, despite the shift from
the fascist sympathetic Vichy to the theoretically democratic France. This time it was a
“moral obligation (obligation morale)” to work. 101

The majority of labor in AOF was

“recruited by [administrative] measures (recruitée par mésure),” at this time for both the
public or private sector, according to the governor of Côte d’Ivoire, Dechamps. 102 The
practice that was increased under the fascist regime continued with the “democratic” one.
Both regimes also regarded the African labor force as far from being “physically and
intellectually capable of working at the European rhythm (physiquement et intellectuellement
capable de travailler au rhythme européen).” 103 The idea of racial hierarchy, which would
later be incontrovertibly linked to Nazism, was perpetuated under Free France, which sought
so hard to prove, through language, that it was different.
Once AOF rejoined Free France, however, union activity revitalized. A French decree
restored the right to unionize, though this regulation still carried an educational restriction:
union adherents still needed a degree. 104 In 1943, the Syndicat des Travailleurs Indigènes du
Chemin de Fer Dakar-Niger (STIDN) sent a letter to the governor protesting measures that
curtailed rights during the war period, such as restrictions placed on auxiliaries that did not
allow them to look for work elsewhere, despite poor conditions. The letter said: “the measure
dictated by the ancient government [is] far from being compatible with the democratic spirit
of the committee of national liberation, to which we are infinitely grateful for allowing the
return of union liberties (le mésure dictée par l’ancien gouvernement étant loin d’être
compatible avec l’esprit démocratique du comité de la libération nationale duquel nous
sommes infiniment reconnaissants d’avoir permis le reprise des libertés syndicales).”
Concessions were made for salary increases to offset the increase in the cost of living during
the war after angry cheminot meetings in Thiès, and the union seemed to calm. More
problems arose, however, as the cadre system created wage disparities at the hikes: the
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Europeans and higher-cadre Africans got disproportionately higher wage increases. The
government then revised the salary ladders after more heated meetings in Thiès. A marine
transport enterprise, the Manutention africaine, noted “The indigene elements understand
very well that enterprises need them and they become more and more demand, so that when
they appeal for a salary increase, we will be obliged to give it (L’élément indigène comprend
très bien que les entreprises ont besoin de lui et devient de plus en plus exigeant, donc quand
il réclama une augmentation de salaire, nous serons obligés de la lui accorder). 105 This time,
the colonial administration acted with appeasement, not guns. The African cheminots were
employing the rhetoric of their oppressors to demand change, indicating the hypocrisies
inherent in the structure of the system, which could not continue as an acceptable presence
globally or to the Métropole if it actually articulated the philosophy that was being carried
out. This was made particularly sensitive after the war.
Competing visions of the African worker continued under the Free French regime, as
administrators waffled between accepting Africans as urban workers with rights and
continuing to see them as peasants who needed to be forced to work. 106 Even as the colonial
project allowed for an urban workforce with rights, if they were limited, colons could not
divorce themselves from their mission civilisatrice that would drag the “dark masses” out of
their depths. René Pleven explained colonialism as “liberating [the African from] the great
scourges that ravage primitive societies, which they call illness, superstition, ignorance,
tyranny, corruption, exploitation, or cruelty…To colonize is to civilize, or otherwise
expressed, in its final analysis, to project into space one’s civilization (libératrice des grands
fléaux qui ravagent les sociétés primitives, qu’ils appèlent la maladie, la superstition,
l’ignorance, la tyrannie, la corruption, l’exploitation ou la cruauté…Coloniser c’est civiliser,
autrement dit, en dernière analyse, projeter dans l’espace sa civilisation).” 107

In reality,

however, the mission civilisatrice was the system imbued with cruelty, exploitation,
corruption, ignorance, and tyranny forced into a space. The West African worker, however,
would soon prove to even the colonizers’ notions of a simple peasantry needing to be guided
through to a “higher” state were completely backward.
Several factors under the Vichy and Free France regimes contributed to the conditions
that would allow the railway strike only a few years later. According to James Jones,
“Archival documents and oral sources portray World War II as a period when working
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conditions deteriorated, but labor resistance was minimal. Generally, that was true, but the
seeds of a tremendous confrontation were planted during the years from 1939 to 1945.”
Thiès, as shown above, “remained a center of agitation,” despite inaction and silence on the
part of labor leadership. 108 From the end of 1943, there was a presence of Groupes d’Etudes
Communistes (GEC) that organized against the Vichy regime and supported and inspired
militant unionism. 109 Another factor was that of the clearly racist treatment of Africans in
every area, even with rationing. In AOF, there were severe food shortages during the war.
Ration cards allowed Europeans to receive better-quality food, such as pieces of meat, while
Africans got the innards and bones of animals. One retired cheminot informant interviewed
by Mor Sene explained: “We also lived our ‘apartheid’ (Nous vivions aussi notre
‘apartheid’).” 110 The memory of this oppression would not fade after the war, and it was
made more poignant by the later assimilationist insistences that French citizen and West
African subject resided on the same plane in regards to French law.
One of the most vital components of the 1947-1948 strike was born under the Vichy
colonial government and suffered repression: the Union des Jeunes de Thiès (UJT), which
would later revitalize the cheminot union and whose leaders would take over the union to
draw it into greater militancy. Gning regained control of the entire cheminot movement
during the war, since the auxiliaries, even further restricted under Vichy, were unable to
remain a separate organization. 111 Gning’s time, however, was drawing to a close. The UJT
began by circulating an underground paper. 112 UJT members and contributors included Mory
Tall, Aynina Fall, Doudou Ngom, Aly Bocar Kane, Abdou K. Sow, Birago Mbengue, and
Ibrahima Sarr. Most of the UJT members were teachers and cheminots trained in technical
schools. Their first newspaper was called Afrique Libre, but it was changed after a few issues
to Jeunesse et Démocratie, published by Abdou K. Sow. More often than not, its articles
attacked local authorities, whether colons or collaborators. 113

The UJT “brought out a

youthful vigor against the perceived lethargy of older Senegalese politicians and a new
combativeness towards the French,” personally attacking even the higher up colonial
administrators, such as the Circle Commandant of Thiès. 114 Until the fifth issue, Jeunesse et
Démocratie called itself “an organ of total socialism (un organe du socialisme integral),” but
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its actual affiliation is more difficult to gauge. Politics in general, however, were dominated
by the SFIO and the Quatre Communes elite at this time. In an interview with Mor Sene,
Abdou K. Sow asserted: “We were simply nationalists who decided to fight against the
injustice to which we were all vulnerable (Nous étions simplement des nationalistes décidés à
combattre l’injustice à laquelle nous étions tous sensibles).” The sixth issue of Jeunesse et
Démocratie said it was “ an organ of socialist youth un organe des jeunesses socialistes.”
Most of UJT members became SFIO militants, and according to Sow, “We were the left wing
of the party (Nous étions l’aile gauche du parti).” 115 Malick Sow asserts that the UJT started
as with “vague ambitions (ambitions vagues)” that hardened to “an orientation more or less
political to become the youth sector of the Thiès SFIO (une orientation plus ou moins
politique pour devenir la section jeune de la SFIO de Thiès).” For Mory Tall, the first
secretary general of UJT, his group was a radical tool for Africa: “A program of action is
needed to save Africa, and it’s up to us to establish it. If an atomic bomb has to be detonated
to save Africa, that bomb must come from Thiès (Il faut pour sauver l’Afrique un programme
d’action, c’est à nous qu’il appartient de l’établir. S’il y a une bombe atomique qui doit
s’éclater pour sauver l’Afrique, cette bombe doit partir de Thiès).” Tall also called for the
unification of all AOF unions under one federation and that despite ties to SFIO, the UJT
would quickly break with the party if their needs were not met. Sarr, furthermore, berated
Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor for their passivity towards Circle Commandant Cazenare
of Thiès, who was meting out “une politique arbitraire (arbitrary policies).” 116 The militancy
of UJT during the Vichy regime was too much for officials, and the leaders were arrested by
the Vichy government and exiled to the Soudan, Niger, and Upper Volta. One of them was
Ibrahima Sarr. 117
The similarities between Vichy and Free France did not go unnoticed or unexploited
among cheminots during the war, and this proved to be a valuable tool in confronting the
administration. This appeal to the “ideals” of France was not a series of attempts to buy into
the colonial system so much as it was a way to really point out the hypocrisies of the French
government. The radicalism that would define the UJT would not have allowed for that kind
of rapprochement, especially after their ouster of the establishment figure François Gning in
1946. The strike was born out of the context of the war, when the hypocrisy of the French
government became too much when the regime was placed beside that of Vichy. The young
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unionists that stood up to the colonial administration and were exiled for it became the leaders
of the 1947 strike movement that again challenged the colonial project and its system that
depended so heavily on the maintenance of racialization.

The End of World War II :
Changes in the Colonial System and the Lead-up to the Strike

When World War II drew to a close the balance of global power shifted and colonial
empires came under scrutiny. As French colonial attitudes towards African societies and
economies began to change and the Fourth Republic was formed, labor relations in Senegal
began to evolve, if in rhetoric only. Furthermore, World War II allowed “the thousands of
Blacks [in the colonial empire] to experience a brutal discovery of the white man. Long
envelopped in the myth of invincibility, the white man revealed himself in all his veracity:
human like all others (les milliers de Noires l’occasion d’une découverte brutale de l’homme
blanc. Longtemps enveloppé de mythe de l’invincibilité, le Blanc s’était révélé dans toute sa
véracité : humain comme tous les autres).” Africans returning from war came back with a
“more acute sense of human dignity (sens plus aigu de la dignité humaine),” 118 and the heavy
involvement of Africans in the war effort in Europe as soldiers and at home demanded an
examination of colonialism.
The Atlantic Charter, written by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill and
signed by 26 nations in 1942, “opened the debate on colonialism in affirming ‘the right of
peoples’ to choose their form of government. This opposition of international opinion to the
colonial system forced France to accept the necessity of a new examination of its relations
with its empire (ouvrait la bréche dans le colonialisme en affirmant ‘le droit des peuples’ à
choisir leur forme de gouvernment. Cette opposition de l’opinion internationale au system
coloniale poserait-elle à la France la nécéssité d’un nouvel examen de ses rapports avec son
empire).” 119

The foundation of the United Nations and American and Soviet calls for

decolonization underlined the new global focus on human rights 120 and the global wariness
towards any political system that suggested fascism.
The Brazzaville Conference of February 1944 also complicated France’s position
towards its colonies. Brazzaville, which gathered the higher-up colonial administrators to
118
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discuss the future of the French Empire, noticeably lacked the presence of any Africans or
other colonial subjects.

At Brazzaville, colonial officials did give Africans a minority

representation in the government, 121 in the form of a weak territorial assembly, as well as the
end of the indigénat code, which had separated citizens and subjects into two separate legal
systems; a five-year timetable to end forced labor; the eight-hour workday; and the creation of
the Inspection du Travail to regulate colonial labor practices and unions. 122
The Brazzaville communiqué, however, illustrated the flip side of France’s nascent
assimilationism: the authors expressed doubts over the ability of African workers to enter the
wage system, as they “did not respect work contracts (ne respecte pas les contrats du travail)”
and were subject to “laziness and inertia (la paresse et l’inertie).” The communiqué went on
to say: “[…] Whether he is a citizen or a subject, the indigène only needs to furnish proof of
his competence, of his training, and of his qualifications. For equal competence, equal pay
(qu’il soit citoyen ou sujet, l’indigène n’a à fournir que les preuves de son compétence, de sa
formation, et de ses titres. A compétence égale, rénumeration égale…).” It was made clear,
however, that management positions would rest in the hands of the French. 123 In the end, the
recommendations of Brazzaville made it clear that despite a high rhetoric supporting
extension of equality, the reality was far from achieving such a goal, and the intent of the
French government was not to allow the colonies to govern themselves, whether as a wing of
France or as independent nations. The status of the colonized as a worker remained in
question, since colonials were still unable to decide if they saw Africans as peasants or
workers. This double standard, of promising reform and equality and instead reinforcing a
theory of racially based inferiority was a way to pretend that the ideals of the French
government were being upheld while still maintaining control. The colonial system, in fact,
could not hold without a systematic imposition of imbalanced race relations.
In late 1945, citizenship was extended to all French subjects in colonies, which also
became officially a part of France, 124 designated as territoires outre-mer or overseas
territories, and the subsequent elections in all of French Africa led to a victory for “le Bloc
africain.”

Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor were elected deputies. 125

In AOF, a

movement towards nationalist anticolonialism began afer the war, resulting in the creation of
such parties as the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA) in October 1946, which
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“would serve to support the development of unionism in francophone Africa (va servir de
support au développement du syndicalisme en Afrique francophone),” 126 and “the democratic
movement affirming the African personality (le mouvement démocratique affirmant la
personnalité africaine).” 127 Freedom of the press was extended to French overseas territories
in the fall of 1946 and the freedom of assembly and of association in the spring of 1946. The
Loi Houphuët-Boigny of the spring of 1946, named after the Ivorian RDA politcian who
authored and became celebrated for the law, ended forced labor. 128 Despite these changes,
the politicians, according to De Benoist, remained removed from their constituents: “While
African parlementarian action exercised itself in the metropolitan assemblies, the unions were
more in contact with the population and above all with the most dynamic classes (Alors que
l’action des parlementaire africains s’exerçait dans des assemblées métropolitaines, les
syndicats étaient davantage au contact avec les populations et surtout avec les classes les plus
dynamiques…).” 129 Mor Sene, on the other hand, argues that the political empowerment of
Africans and the legalization of unions in September of 1944 allowed unions and political
parties to move out “of the limited circle of the intelligentsia to find support from the masses
that was indispensable to their demands (du cadre restreint de l’intelligentsia, pour trouver un
support de masse indispensable à leurs revendications).” 130 The reforms made by the French
government were meant as token rights for colonized “citizens,” some token rights, but these
few freedoms served, ultimately, to allow them to demand full rights and to create the frames
that would bring independence.
The National Constitutional Assembly, which formed in 1946 to make the constitution
for the Fourth Republic of France, asserted that the French Union was “a union founded on
the equality of rights and of duties (une union fondée sur l’égalité des droits et des
devoirs).” 131 Thus began French assimilationism in earnest. This rhetoric added another
layer of complication and hypocrisy to the French colonial system, which was obviously at
odds with the high egalitarian language espoused by the Métropole and the colonial
administration.

Once the colonial administration realized the implications of political

assimilation, such as full citizenship and equal representation, which would have meant, as
historian Joseph-Roger De Benoist pointed out, “three hundred or four hundred African
126
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deputies and, why not, a Black elected President of the Republic (trois cents ou quatre cents
députés africains et, pourquoi pas, un Noir élu à la Présidence de la République),” they began
to “back away (réculait).” At the mention of economic and social equality, which African
unionists and politicians exploited to claim equal rights, the Métropole also reneged, insisting
that African economies were not ready to support themselves. The 1946 Fourth Republic
constitutional assembly did not formulate “a clear choice (un choix clair)” regarding
assimilation, choosing instead to seek a space between colonialism and assimilation. 132 In
reality, all that changed with the introduction of assimilationism was that the term “empire”
was replaced with “union,” and the Minister of Colonies became the Minister of Overseas
France.
The assimilationist language, however, allowed what Mor Sene terms the “front du
réfus” (“the refusal front”) at a very early date to demand decolonization or the creation of a
consented union with France based on equal rights. The front du réfus was supported by the
Parti Communiste français (PCF) and became the RDA. 133

According to De Benoist,

decolonization was “provoked (provoquée)” because the Métropole would not take on the
financial implications of assimilation, which also exposed its unwillingness to extend full
democracy to its African “citizens.” 134 Henri Brunschwig, quoted in De Benoist, writes: “And
one could say that ‘the opposition to the colonizer was enacted more in the name of [the
colonizer’s] principles than in the name of specifically African traditions.

The new

generation of the founders of the new Africa took up the school of the West to oppose the
West’ (Et l’on a pu dire que ‘l’opposition au colonisateur se fit plus au nom des principes de
celui-ci qu’au nom des traditions spécifiquement africains…la génération des fondateurs de
l’Afrique nouvelle se mit à l’école de l’Occident pour s’opposer à l’Occident’)” 135 Those
who struggled against colonialism used the langue of colonialism to topple it. Although the
use of French rhetoric for African rights and liberty did seem to give in to the ideals that were
oppressing the colonies, such a strategy was merely a tool in the hands of militants, who,
whether or not they were consciously fighting for independence, were all the same going
against the system, using its language to break it down.
The creation of Fonds d’investissement pour le développement économique et social
(FIDES) by French legislation put money into AOF economies and infrastructure, such as the
Dakar-Niger, which was upgraded and lengthened.
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another 3,000 workers for new services in Thiès. This increase in activity allowed for a great
union recruitment that still, however, remained divided by race. Europeans were “set up in a
very privileged situation…[and] proved themselves to be racist by taking a position in favor
of the management and of the government (disposant d’une situation très privilegiée…[et] se
montraient racistes [en prennant] position en faveur du patronat et du gouvernement).” 136 As
before the war, unions were divided along racial lines and the system favored white workers.
“Development” was actually the updated term for the mission civilisatrice, and the colonial
government had no intention of bettering the situation of colonized workers, unless an
amelioration would also benefit their economic interests.
The end of the war and the years after also marked a new demographic shift in who
was involved in politics. After the war, education in the colonies improved and expanded,
allowing youth to move to the forefront of the nationalist movement, though this occurred
predominantly after 1950. 137 For Omar Guèye, “The war marks the political awakening of
the young generations who wanted to have a little right of inspection in their country (La
guerre marque le réveil politique des jeunes générations qui désiraient avoir un petit droit de
regard dans l’administration de leur pays).” 138 Assimilationist rhetoric would be the way to
demand the rights and equality denied to them, even if the new militants were only using that
rhetoric to point out the hypocrisy of colonialism. The older, elite establishment, made up of
Quatre Communes évolués, such as politician Lamine Guèye and union leader François
Gning, “accepted this assimilation as the departure point of an evolution towards total
equality of rights with the metropolitan citizens (acceptaient cette assimilation comme point
de départ d’une évolution vers une totale égalité des droits avec les citoyens
métropolitains).” 139 Like the new youth militants, such as the UJT, elite Africans embraced
assimilationist rhetoric. The difference would manifest itself through the different ways in
which the two groups treated assimilationism. For the elites, a slow “evolution” to “prepare”
Africans for the rights of French citizens was not only acceptable, it was preferable: they
often bought into the colonial racialized system as much as the colons themselves. For
Lamine Guèye, “Thus, this man, this Senegalese, exults at the idea of ‘Senegal, integral part
of France.’ He was prepared to live and to die for this idea (Ainsi cet homme, ce Sénégalais,
s’exaltait à l’idée d’un ‘Sénégal, partie intégrante de la France.’ Il était préparé à vivre et à
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mourir pour cette idée).” 140 The new generation of African unionists and militants used the
colonial rhetoric just as freely, but their intention was to illustrate how far the expressed
colonial and French ideology were from reality: the “whited sepulcher” of colonialism had to
be exposed to the metropolitan public and to the world so as to gain rights, freedoms, and
even possibly independence.

The Cheminot Strike of 1947-1948
The railway strike of 1947-1948 was a new breed of strike in AOF, one that extended
across colonial borders, if not across professional ones. The strike was unique and notable for
its great duration. “Cinq mois et dix jours,” (five months and ten days) was the constant
refrain of every informant interviewed by the author, ex-striker or no.

The level of

mobilization and unity required in the union and in the community also set the rail strike
apart, even if the demands of the strikers were not met as fully as hoped. The political
influences and elements that attempted to and did effect the strike and the strikers created new
connections that tied the cheminots inextricably to the emerging struggle against colonialism
in AOF and to the political parties that would run Senegal in the lead-up to and after
independence. This connection, however, has remained questionable throughout the body of
historical work on the strike and was strongly rejected by the informants of this project.
Research, however, points to an undeniable link between the cheminot union and political
parties. Despite this conflict over the historical record, the strike was a “direct threat to the
colonial system” 141 economically, socially, politically, and ideologically, and indubitably
shaped the path Senegal would take to independence.

The Lead-Up to the Strike
In January of 1946, dockers, commercial and industrial laborers, and government
functionaries went on strike for 11 days, an event later referred to as the Senegalese General
Strike of 1946. There were more agitations and strikes all over Senegal for two months after
the walkout. The strikers made “substantial gains” in the work place after demanding a shift
in labor status from temporary to permanent, job security, and a system of advancement. 142
The most glaring absence was that of the Syndicat des Travailleurs Indigènes du Chemin de
Fer Dakar-Niger (STIDN). François Gning, still union Secretary General, refused 1946 strike
participation for his union, an act that was unforgotten and unforgiven by both the cheminots
140
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in the UJT and by the striking unions. According to James Jones, “[Frederick] Cooper
attributed this to Gning's socialist ties, which made him reluctant to embarrass the local
administration, plus the fact that railroad workers had already won a number of concessions
on their own. As a result, railroad workers received none of the concessions awarded to other
workers after the general strike.” 143 In other words, since the cheminots were still reaping in
the benefits from earlier concessions, Gning saw no reason to challenge the colonial
administrators who had supported the labor leader for almost two decades. According to Mor
Sene, Gning kept the cheminots out of the 1946 general strike by cutting a deal with the Régie
that upped salaries, especially for elites. 144 Interestingly, the demands from the General
Strike were very similar to those that the cheminots would submit a few months later. After
the 1946 strike, Gning started a strike fund partly as a “delay tactic,” so that, as he explained,
“the example furnished by the groups that recently went on strike will allow railwaymen to
reflect on the gravity of an act which constitutes a two-edged sword.” 145

This non-

participation in the General Strike would anger many cheminots and further damage Gning’s
position in the union.

The days of back channel contacts and collaborations with the

government were coming to a close.
In this atmosphere, the UJT moved to take over the union. The conflict with Gning grew
as auxiliary delegates demanded support from the union for salary readjustments and cadre
agents denounced the arbitrary cadre classification, in which agents of similar status were put
into different levels. 146 On May 23, 1946, the UJT staged a “revolution” in the STIDN at a
1,000 person meeting in Thiès, attacking Gning’s non-combativeness, his non-cooperation in
the 1946 strike, and his alienation of non-elites. Gning resigned and Ibrahima Sarr was named
Secretary General. 147 As opposed to Gning, who was a Quatre Communes évolué committed
to privilege and hierarchy, unwilling to attack the top. The UJT was mostly made up of young
Muslims. 148 This takeover was a mobilizing action in STIDN, one that opened a new era for
the union. Overt inaction and passivity were no longer acceptable in a union leader, and as
Lamine Guèye would discover after the strike, they were no longer acceptable in a political
leader either.
On July 17, 1946, the Régie des Chemins de Fer was designated to take over the AOF
railroad system under Director Cunéo, replacing the Direction des Travaux Publics. It was
143
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“an organism with an industrial and commercial character endowed with a civilian personality
and financial autonomy (un organisme caractère civile et commerciale doté de la personnalité
civile et de l’autonomie financière).” The Régie changes occurred because the railroad was
no longer economically viable for the government to run. Essentially, the government wanted
to “get rid of the burden (débarrasser du fardeau)” that was the railroad. 149 In 1946, there
were 478 Europeans, 1,729 Africans, and 15,726 auxiliaries on the line. 150 The Régie
takeover was an attempt to make the railroad semi-public and semi-corporate, a move that
meant railroad workers were no longer government employees and their wages and any future
wage increases would have to depend on the success of the revenue of the railroad, not
government budgeting. According to Jones, “For the activists of the Jeunes de Thiès [who
took over STIDN], this [the Régie change] was the last straw.” 151 The colonial administration
played a significant role in the Régie, and the makeup of the Régie’s administrative board,
which was full of colonial officials, illustrated the “desire of the metropolitan authorities to
control the railroad (volonté des autorités métropolitaines de contrôler les chemins de fer),” 152
despite the administration’s desire to separate itself from the financial nightmare of the
railroad. As before, the colonial administration took steps to save itself money, to force
colonial projects to pay for themselves while attempting to preserve control over those
projects.
After the UJT takeover, the union’s tone shifted dramatically. At his takeover as secretarygeneral, Sarr reorganized the union into subdivisions, five in Thiès and seven along the rest of
the line.

153

As Sarr traveled the line in 1946, African cheminot unions in AOF decided to

band together, forming the Fédération des Syndicats des Cheminots Africains (FSCA), with
central direction ceded to the Comité Directeur, or the leaders of the Dakar-Niger union
branch at Thiès, under Sarr. 154 In July of 1946, Sarr protested: “The Régie refuses to give us
everything it has given the other [European] union Direction: printing, circulation, union
cards. It is now necessary for us to count on our own strength (La Régie nous réfuse tout ce
qu’elle avait accordé à l’autre Direction: impression, circulation, cartes syndicales. Il nous
faut donc compter sur nos propres forces).” Sarr asked for an annual membership fee and
donations for a strike fund, “because the demands that we will submit in August must find the
union ready (Car les revendications que nous deposerons en Août doivent trouver le syndicat
149
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prêt).” 155 In August of 1946, the union submitted its demands, at the center of which was the
cadre unique 156 and the integration of auxiliaries into the cadre system. The union also called
for a three-day AOF-wide strike. This action initially seemed successful.157
For the auxiliaries and many other cheminots, the demands “translated their desire to end
the injustice that they could feel in their bones (traduisait leur volonté de mettre un terme à
une injustice qu’ils avaient sentie dans leur chair).” 158 The demands were a way to express
the frustration the cheminots felt at being promised equality and never getting it. For the
Régie, the demands came at a moment when “it otherwise envisaged staff reductions spread
out over three years (a elle envisagerait d’ailleurs une compression des effectifs étalée sur
trois ans).” 159 As usual, the railroad was in a financial bind, and as on previous occasions, the
easiest way to get of the financial problem was with uncompensated layoffs and poor wages.
For the European cheminots, the demands meant the end of their privileges, since they
believed that once there was a cadre unique, privileges would universally decrease instead of
increase, in an effort to save money. 160 This set them apart and against the African cheminots
even more firmly than before. For the colonial administration, the end of inequality in a work
setting “seemed to put in question the system of colonial domination one of the pillars of
which was discrimination (semblaient remettre en question le système de domination
coloniale dont un des piliers était la discrimination).” 161 This questioning of the colonial
system came through the rhetoric of the French Republic, which, ironically, negated the entire
operation of its empire in the language of its constitution. According to Jean Suret-Canale,
the Régie exploited the sentiment among European cheminots to keep the workers divided by
“la barrière de couleur” (the color barrier). Though there were some sympathizers in the
European rail union, they could not stop the split between European and African cheminots
from occurring. 162 The Régie did not refuse the demand for the cadre unique, but it did
stipulate that such a change would only come with layoffs, 163 which would be decided with
the collaboration of the union. The Haut Commissaire put together a commission to study the
union demands, called the Commission Villedeuil. 164
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which were held in twenty rounds between December and August, were constantly at an
impasse. 165
In October of 1946, representatives of the four railroads (FSCA) voted for disassociation
from the Confédération Générale du Travail, the French union conglomerate, because, “as
Sarr explained, the organization of the railroad placed all European employees in the position
of management with respect to Africans, so a single union could not possibly represent both
groups' interests.” Sarr and his comrades also rejected official political party affiliation. 166
This autonomy would not last past the strike, but the union did display a new combativeness
in rejecting support from a European organization: these actions further proved that despite
the French assimilationist rhetoric that the union would exploit, they did not necessarily want
that assimilation. The union was ready to be an organization independent of the crutch and
the limitation of a French union federation.
In response to the Commission Villedeuil resistance, new union demands were submitted
March 21, 1947. The union’s demands included: “severance packages equal to one month of
pay for each year of service, the retention of all auxiliaries with more than three years of
service, and prompt notice of the number of auxiliaries that were to be fired by the Régie
(prime de licenciement égale à un mois de solde par année de service ; le maintien dans leurs
fonctions tous auxiliaires comptant plus de 3 ans d’ancienneté, au réseau ; d’etre informé le
plus tot possible, du nombre des auxiliaires à licencier par la Régie).” 167

In April, the

frustrated union withdrew from the Commission Villedeuil and called for a strike on April 19,
when President Vincent Auriol was scheduled to visit the colonies. To prepare for the April
strike and further action, the union took control of the Thiès food cooperative, the union
treasury accounted for 735,925 francs and asked for more donations from cheminots, and the
union leadership traveled the line to explain the union’s position so that workers would strike
in large numbers on the strike date.168 This first strike was quickly but thoroughly planned, as
the union counted money, prepared food supplies, and mobilized the line.

Meticulous

planning would be one of the strengths of the longer strike that would follow in the fall.
The April 1947 strike ended quickly, as its visibility was embarrassing to the colonial
administration during the presidential visit—it ended on the strike date, April 19, after a
meeting between President Auriol and Régie and colonial administrations. The Régie agreed
to the union demands, including auxiliary integration and the cadre unique. At this time,
165
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however, the French economy was not doing well, so officials tried to keep prices and wages
down (since wage increases affected price levels). In August 1947, the Régie announced that
it was “in the red” and would not be able to commence auxiliary integration. 169 In September,
the union met in Thiès to fix a strike date, October 10. 170 Sarr convinced the union, which
had agitated for an earlier strike date, to delay a month to rally more along the Dakar-Niger
and around AOF, to organize the cooperative to stockpile food, and to create a strike
committee for each union sub-division for daily meetings to “maintain discipline” during the
strike. 171

The new union leadership thorough preparation for the strike provided the

movement with more power, allowing the strikers to maintain longer without a steady income.
Sarr then toured around AOF, to Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey, and Guinée, to get the rail lines in
the AOF behind the Dakar-Niger. Gaston Fiankan, the Ivorian union leader, promised the
Abdijan-Niger Line's participation in the strike. 172 On October 8th, Sarr called for calm
during the strike, aware of the administration’s ability to use any and all tactics to break the
strike, especially if strikers became violent. 173 The Gouverneur-Général met with union
leaders on the eve of the strike in an attempt to intimidate them, while the Inspection du
Travail tried to offer conciliation, but the walk-out occurred all the same on midnight of
October 10th, when 17,000 cheminots and 2,000 dockers stopped work. On November 1st,
only 38 Africans were on the job. 174

Community, Family, and Other Support Systems
Historians are unanimous in recognizing that the incredible length of the strike rested on
two important factors: the meticulous planning and strong leadership that went into the initial
stages of the strike and the West African community that supported the strikers throughout the
five months and ten days. Frederick Cooper wrote that there was “No question that the
leadership played a big part” in the unity and length of the strike, which was discussed and
planned in far in advance. Daily strike meetings in Thiès aired out all doubts and concerns and
were a way to ensure that “peer pressure was maintained.” At signs of uncertainty, Sarr
traveled the line to boost morale through a “direct approach.” Sarr “cemented a personal
identification of the cause with himself and with the strike committee.” 175 This personal
169
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identification not only kept the strike going, it further solidified Sarr as the center of the
strike, and he was later associated as the symbol of the strike and the cheminots.
The second factor, that of community support, proved vital to the strike’s duration. Jean
Suret-Canale attributed the survival of the strike to family ties, which he described as “la
tradition de la solidarité africaine.” 176 For Frederick Cooper, family ties, urban connections,
and the timing of the strike after the harvest were all important, and women played a central
role in maintaining discipline. One striking cheminot said: “We are now like marabouts: we
are not working, but we have our food all the same (Nous sommes maintenant comme des
marabouts: nous ne travaillons pas, mais nous avons cependant notre revitaillement).” 177 As
for women, Mor Sene wrote: “The cheminots are unanimous in saying that they were
magnificent…at the sides of their husbands (Les cheminots sont unanimes pour dire qu’elles
étaient magnifiques…aux cotés de leurs maris).” Women sold their jewelry and clothes to
feed their families and were integral in criticism of strikebreakers and possibly even
hardening the resolve of those who were thinking of caving in. They made songs praising
Sarr and criticizing those who broke the strike. They even invented new braids that were
named after Sarr. 178 In 1938, women handed rocks to the men to throw at colonial troops, but
in 1947, the strike was "non-violent [and] carefully controlled." The women contributed
food, sold goods at the market, and engaged in non-wage activities to support their families.
179

Although Ousmane Sembene’s God Bits of Wood accurately depicts the central role of

women in the strike effort, his narrative goes too far, according to the historical record, since
he recounts a women’s march from Thiès to Dakar as well as intense skirmishes between
women and colonial police and soldiers, which, according to Frederick Cooper, do not hold
up to oral accounts by ex-strikers and police reports. 180 In interviews with informants,
however, the oral history runs up against a contradiction. El Hadj Yoro Faye, a high-cadre
agent who participated in the strike and Maïssa Sow, an ex-cheminot mentioned that women
threw rocks at the police and military men who had come to evict them from their Régie
housing. They called this “une révolte contre l’armée,” where women also gathered to march
in protest against their evictions and fought against the authorities with the pestles they used
to pound millet. 181

Another informant, Abdoulaye Cissé, the union archivist and self-

proclaimed “expert” on the truth about the strike, asserted forcefully that was no violence of
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any kind during the strike, and that the strikers and their families remained in their homes all
day until union morale meetings every day at five o-clock. 182 Historians, on a whole, are
adamant about the peaceful nature of the strike and that the strikers renounced “classique”
strike techniques, such as picketing, marches, and sit-ins, relying solely on mobilization. 183
Historical truth is a difficult thing, and it is possible that the truth lies somewhere in the
middle of historians’, Sembene’s, and ex-strikers’ accounts: none of these forms of
information can be deemed free of bias or of revision.
The "complex web of affiliation" that offered food, money, and support was of a makeup
that meant that each contributor could give a little here and there, 184 and the community
included more than just families: merchants, other unions, newspapers, and even some French
played a role in sustaining the movement. In Bamako, a merchant’s union and political
parties donated money. In Tambacounda, local elites donated money and a merchant donated
sheep. Senegalese merchants “appear to have played a particularly important role” by giving
money, transportation, and food.

Some Lebanese and Syrians helped by employing

strikers. 185 Rural ties were also very important, since families in villages could supply food.
The union even encouraged strikers with rural relatives to return to their villages in order to
reduce the burden in the towns. 186

Railway communities at Thiès and Kayes were the

backbone of the movement, and the concentration of cheminots and their families, which first
created the solidarities and connections that led to a new militancy, now helped sustain the
strikers.
The union’s preparative measures were not in vain either. The indigène cooperative in
Thiès, which was originally created by the railroad administration, offered bulk goods for the
cheminots, and the strike’s timing at the end of the harvest meant full granaries.

The

cooperative, which supplied food on credit to the strikers, was 1,560,000 Francs in debt at the
end of the strike. 187 According to El Hadj Yoro Faye and Maïssa Sow, the cheminots, in
preparation for the strike, all contributed by giving half of their daily rations to the
cooperative. Furthermore, during the strike “no one touched any money (personne n’a touché
un franc),” 188 which meant that the strike funds, cooperative, and community support
contributed to the cheminots were even more vital. Strike funds were also given out to
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cheminots with families. Single men were not given money since it was thought that they
"could improvise more easily." 189 The length of the strike was more than even the long
preparations of the union could handle, however. The cooperative in Thiès was completely
empty and out of funds in three months. A few men went back to work in Senegal, just under
thirty, in late December. Sene attributes this to the fact that they were of Soudanese origin
and did not have families to support them. 190
Newspapers also helped the strike movement. The newspaper L’AOF became “la voix du
prolétariat noir,” according to Mor Sene, expressing solidarity and announcing meetings and
tam-tams benefiting the strike effort. 191

For Suret-Canale, however, L’AOF, which was

affiliated with SFIO was anti-communist “bordering on hysteria (allant…à l’hysterie),” but
also included articles from militants associated with the strike who defended the cheminot
cause while remaining against the socialism of RDA. An article by Obèye Dioup in L’AOF in
December called for the cheminots to return to work, so as to “preserver l’économie du pays
qui est le leur…Ce ne sera pas du défaitisme. Mais l’acceptation libre d’un sacrifice, au profit
de la collectivité africaine.” In March of 1948, however, AK Sow wrote in L’AOF that it was
time to stop the anti-communist and anti-imperialist rhetoric because “Nous desservons notre
proper cause en nous écartant du veritable problème qui se resume dans cette formule si
humaine: égalité sociale, politique, et économique.” 192 The RDA-associated newspaper Le
Réveil, wrote often in support of the strikers and even sold three issues at a higher price to
donate the extra revenue to the strikers. 193 The notable aspect of the media’s role in the strike
was the obvious political maneuvering going on behind the stories. Each party or each
political movement had something to say about the strike, even in silence.
Since November 1947, members of other unions tried to get their organizations to join the
strike. Advocates for joining the strike expressed fears that if the cheminots failed or were
repressed by the administration, it could mean the end of all union activity in AOF or even
Africa. 194 These attempts to rally other unions all failed. The reasons, according to Cooper,
could have come from three factors: it was retaliation for the cheminot’s non-involvement in
1946, the cheminot union was autonomous while most others were with the CGT, or the other
unions were still in negotiations from the 1946 strike and did not want to jeopardize their
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settlement. 195 The strikers did receive monetary support from unions and other organizations.
The CGT gave 500,000 francs, L’AOF’s donation almost matched the CGT’s, and more than
a million francs came from other sources.196 The Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs des
Chemins de Fer de France, des Colonies et des Pays de Protectorat sent a letter of support to
the FSCA that said they had been trying to communicate with the Minister of Overseas
Territories on their behalf. 197 To give an idea of the scale of the strike, CGT’s large donation
ran out in a week. 198 French and African sources contributed to the strike movement, and
even though CGT was rebuffed by the FSCA before the strike, it still gave money. The strike
took on a significance outside of AOF that brought solidarity from varied groups.

Colonial Action and Inaction
The strike came at a very bad time for the colonial export economy. It occurred right at
the end of the harvest, when “Senegalese peanuts, Soudanese cotton, Guinean bananas, and
Ivorian cocoa and coffee travelled [sic] on a combination of […transportation to…] the coast.
While a railroad strike could not completely shut down the export economy…it increased
costs and delays…For products that deteriorated slowly in storage--that delay was a concern."
The wharf and port strikes in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Dahomey increased the problem by
curtailing the export from the coast as well. 199 The timing of the strike was not deliberate,
according to Suret-Canale, who wrote that this “coincidence,” however, explained the
“tension in the administration and colonial interests (raidissement de l’administration et des
interêts coloniaux).” 200 The strike’s timing could not have been better, and despite SuretCanale’s assertion that the timing was unintentional, given the amount of preparation put into
the strike, Sarr’s delay of one month, and the length of time it took to reach the decision to
strike (over a year), this could very well have been a consideration, one meant to cripple the
AOF economy and push the colonial administration into quick action.
According to French colonial law, the strike was technically illegal. The only legallyrecognized strikes had to go through conciliatory meetings, an arbitration committee to hear
the grievances from both sides and make a ruling on the labor dispute, then a sub-arbitrary
committee—if no conciliation could be reached after these steps, the strike was legal. 201 The
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administration took 32 days to respond to the demands, and Sarr used this delay as
justification for a legal strike. 202

On October 9, the administration tried to set up an

arbitration committee. Sarr and other union leaders met with the Régie leadership, Director
Cunéo and Secretary-General Blanchot. There was no accord, however, which the union took
as a legal end to the conciliation proceedings. In a letter, Sarr wrote “Time for us is too
precious. We still have thousands of comrades with miserable salaries. Since August 1946,
the expected improvements have remained unresolved (Le temps pour nous est trop précieux.
Nous avons encore des milliers de camarades avec des salaires de misère. Depuis Août 1946,
les ameliorations attendues demeurent en suspens).” 203 The sub-arbitration committee formed
after the strike. The October 20th official ruling had only one difference from the original
conciliation ruling with the first arbitration committee: auxiliary integration would
retroactively begin from July 15, instead of the 1st of October. All of the strikers’ demands
were rejected. Subsequent appeals led to more rulings in favor of the Régie. 204 Since the
arbitration committee was a colonial product, these rulings were not too surprising. According
to James Jones, “administration officials were confident that an illegal strike would collapse
within a few days.” 205
Colonial action to upset the strike was slow to come and less repressive than earlier
actions against strikes. There was not too much action to stop the strike before it began, but as
strike date neared, the administration took some measures. In Bamako, the mayor made it
illegal to post public notices, and the railroad administration rescheduled the Bamako-Dakar
express so that it would run one more time between the cities until the moratorium four days
later. During the strike, extra police were deployed. At the end of the second week, fuel
rationing and requirements for all visitors to have identity cards on Soudanese public property
were put into place. On October 26, Bamako and Kati were put under martial law. Special
police patrolled the train stations and military checkpoints blocked all roads into the area. 206
Besides that, the government and the Régie waited for the sub-arbitrational committee ruling,
which the administration believed would stop the strike: Cooper called this attitude “selfdeception,”
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Confident in their superiority, they could not imagine that the strike could last as long as it
did.
When the union did not resume work on October 31, the date designated after the subarbitrational decision, pressure increased. The administration announced the hiring of strike
breakers and charged Sarr and Fiankan with starting an illegal strike. "For a few days, it
appeared that the strike might collapse, but when Sarr attended a meeting at Kayes on 10
November, the police reported that his presence restored the confidence of the striking
workers." 208 The Régie’s confidence in a quick strike collapse was foundering. In midNovember, Sarr was taken to court and sentenced to 20 days and a 1,200-franc fine. In April
after the strike, an appeals court dropped his sentence to a 100F fine, but he never served.
Fiankan was sentenced to three months, but also he was not jailed. Appeals overturned the
ruling. After the strike, the administration again pressed charges, but his sentence of six
months, which was dropped to two months and fine, ended in a pardon. 209 Sarr and Fiankan’s
convictions and evasions of jail time illustrated the administration’s fear of creating a broader
and perhaps more violent confrontation, as Mor Sene put it: “The administration avoided
throwing oil on the fire (L’administration évitait de verser de l’huile dans le feu).” 210 It was
clear that, from the administration’s inaction, this strike had something different about it.
Instead of giving in immediately or using repressive techniques, both past tactics for ending
strikes, the colonial government and the Régie instead avoided a costly settlement and
angering the populace, which was clearly enmeshed in the strike movement by doing very
little at all.
The administration tried to get cheminots back on the job by putting up flyers that
threatened consequences for the broken contracts resulting from the illegality of the strike and
promised satisfaction for those who returned to work. 211 When this did not work, they funded
the rival Syndicat Libre des Cheminots Africains du Dakar-Niger, headed by Gning, and
provided it with a “fully stocked food cooperative.” 212 The leaders of the Syndicat Libre and
other unions that broke the strike worked with elected officials and politicians who were
“hostile” to the strike, including politicians from the anti-RDA Parti Progressiste and the
SFIO.

213
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errors on the job. At the end of January 1948, French cheminots were imported at doubled
salaries. 214 The 300 French railway workers sent to Dakar as skilled labor, experienced
pressured from the CGT and anticolonial press to show solidarity. Some asked to go home,
others said that the equipment was faulty in an attempt to get out of working. 215 Other
metropolitan cheminots refused to come to AOF at all if it meant breaking the strike.216 In
1948, the administration started operating diesel trains, which ex-strikers later interpreted as
an attempt to end the strike, since diesel requires fewer workers and the temperatures were
bearable for Europeans. 217 This shift to diesel would later prove to be one of the downfalls of
cheminots as a powerhouse union in the politics and happenings of Senegal.
The administration also turned to community leaders, such as marabouts, assimilés, and
notables to weaken the resolve of the striking communities.

The Grand Marabout of

Tivouane, the leader of the Senegalese Tijanyya movement was one of those collaborators, as
was Racine Mademba, from the Council of the French Union. Strike participants testified,
however, and police reports confirmed that many lesser religious leaders supported the
strikers. 218 According to police informants, marabouts would remain silent in public but
privately, they supported or at least remained neutral towards the strike. 219
Newspapers were also used as propaganda tools for the colonial administration. They
often printed stories meant to dishearten strikers, question their credibility, and link them with
political movements that the administration thought would be unattractive to strike supporters.
The paper Climats accused the RDA of using the strike as a tool to damage the SFIO.
Interestingly, this accusation of political manipulation would later be echoed against the RDA
and again once Senghor left the SFIO to form his own party. The newspaper Paris-Dakar
accused the strike of being run behind-the-scenes by “meneurs,” in other words, communists,
which reflected the red-scare tactics and sentiments of the administration.

220

Paris-Dakar

went even farther when it claimed that African cheminots were actually better paid that
Europeans and that the shortage of vegetable oils caused by the strike would spark a global
health emergency. 221 Once again, the media, when not resorting to outright lies, focused on
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the political ties that lurked behind the strike. Whether or not these politics were really there,
the administration was fearful enough about them to make them a reality for at least half of
the parties involved in the strike. The media, even in attempting to influence public opinion
though propaganda, still managed to hit upon a vein or two that would later plague politicians,
cheminots, and historians.
Colonial responses varied and none were very successful to ending the strike. The
administration was fearful of exposing its hypocrisy in rescinding its postwar ideology of
ending forced labor, building up industrial infrastructure, and encouraging unionism. Robert
Delavignette, who was head of the Ministry of Political Affairs exemplified this sentiment
when he said: “the strong style directed at the strikers will not itself resolve the problem (one
has seen this in the recent past, even in AOF), if the government gives the impression of going
back, after a detour, on trade union freedom and on the abolition of forced labor.” 222 SuretCanale interpreted events in another way, writing that the reluctance of the government to
give into the striker’s demands had to do with Cold War hysteria. Fears of Communist
takeovers led the French government to engage in “une politique de reaction.” This led to a
desire to break unions, which were seen as nurseries for Communism. 223 Thus, the strike was
essentially a stalemate of over five months, and could have been avoided if the cheminots had
been given what they had been promised back in 1946. For Abdoulaye Cissé, the cheminots
would have been right to strike even earlier, back in April of 1947. 224 The use of community
leaders, strike breakers in a skeleton crew, newspaper propoganda, and the like all pointed to
the exceptionalism of this strike. It was not a bunch of violent cheminots that needed to be
put down, nor was giving in an option.

The Régie and the administration, once they

discovered their underestimation of the strength of the strikers, turned to tactics that put the
strikers’ credibility into question. Accusations of communist ties was a manifestation of this
tactic The use of religious and political leaders to restore a sense of hierarchical order to the
community was another, but this reliance on elites proved unhelpful. The strikers and their
communities were beyond listening to the leadership that had so often proved itself to be the
puppet of the colonialists. The use of a strikebreaking crew seemed almost like an attempt to
prove that the strikers were not even needed on the line. All of these responses attempted to
diminish and discredit a movement that in actuality was putting the colonial system into
question and proving how unnecessary it was.
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Politics and Politicians
The most complex aspect of the strike was and still is the connections between politics
and the cheminots. Although politicians did try and succeed to play an active role in the
strike, whether or not they can be tied to the cheminots is another story. According to Cooper,
there was an “uneasy relationship” between the union and political movements and politicians
like Houphuët-Boigny and Senghor “did not make the cause of the strikers their own.” 225
Furthermore, African political parties and politicians were very slow to recognize the
“enormous political and economic importance” of the strike. 226 The reality of the situation
was most likely not far from these assertions: every interviewed informant, ex-striker or no,
was insistent upon the fact that there was absolutely no connection between the cheminots and
the politicians. El Hadj Yoro Faye said that the strikers were “citoyens rëkk (citizens only)”
and that all cheminots were “libre (free)” to support Senghor, Guèye, or any other politician.
At the same time, he as well as Maïssa Sow acknowledged the support given to Senghor after
the strike, saying that Senghor “a vécu avec les Sénégalais (lived with the Senegalese),”
unlike the Quatre Communes elite, who were “considerés comme toubabs, (considered to be
white people),” made worse by the fact that during African military conscription, Quatre
Communes tirailleurs were housed in separate bunks and ate at separate tables. For Faye, the
strike finished this discrimination. 227 For Abdoulaye Cissé, who was a technical school
graduate and an upper-cadre agent, like many members of the UJT, the cheminots “ne
comptaient pas sur les politiques, (did not depend on politics)” and that “la politique n’a rien
avec le syndicat (politics have nothing to do with the union).” He said that the union had even
rebuffed Senghor when he tried to attend an early strike meeting, when he was told to “fout le
calabas (loosely translated, get the hell out).” Cissé echoed Faye in saying that the cheminots
were free to adhere to any party and that the strikers were “cheminots rëkk (cheminots only).”
After the strike, politicians began to “revendiquer les mêmes choses (demand the same
things)” that the cheminot union had been struggling for all along. 228 Frederick Cooper wrote
that from his interviews, strikers reported that there was a fear that they would become the
“auxiliaires” of political parties. 229 The patterns of behavior that followed the strike seemed
to prove that fear correct.
What the politicians did do, however, was discuss the strike in legislative assemblies and
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meetings.

At the creation of the Fourth Republic, Africans were permitted to elect

representatives in the three legislative bodies: the Chamber of Deputies, the Council of the
Republic, and The Assembly of the French Union, which was a kind of parliament for France
and the overseas territories. 230

Félix Houphuët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabriel

d’Arboussier of Gabon started the strike debate in the legislative bodies. Both were in the
Chamber of Deputies and the RDA and both were considered to be colonial adversaries.
D’Arboussier was a Marxist, and Houphuët-Boigny had led the Ivorian cocoa union’s
confrontation with the administration during the war and was still allied with the French
Communist Party (PCF). He was also famous among Africans for authoring the law that
ended forced labor in 1946. The two brought the debate to the Grand Conseil de l’AOF, an
advisory body of the representatives of each territorial council in December of 1947, but the
council president, Lamine Guèye, was opposed to the strike. The Senegalese delegation,
therefore, refused to enter discussions and boycotted a meeting between the union leaders and
Houphuët-Boigny and d’Arboussier, where the two pledged support “in their struggle against
colonialism.” 231 In his 1996 article, Cooper blasted the Grand Conseil de l'AOF for its
inaction, especially since the committee included West African political heavyweights such as
Senghor and Guèye: “French West Africa's most powerful political actors had failed even to
express a collective opinion on the most salient issue of the day.” 232 Despite a later resolution
calling on the government to end the strike in favor of the cheminots, politicians as a group
remained largely removed from the strike movement and ineffectual at creating any sort of
change. Parties did not fare much better. The RDA “did not play any role (ne joua aucun
role),” and its newspaper even went so far as to say “Sarr n’est pas RDA.” The politicians did
not want to mix politics with a professional conflict, according to Cooper. 233 Jones, however,
wrote that “Strike participants thought that the RDA leaders tried to use the situation to
increase their own influence, but believed that after the RDA leaders realized that they could
not control the strikers, they offered support as a means to discredit the colonial
administration.” 234 Houphuët-Boigny of the RDA did initially align with the strike, but even
his role in the caving in of the Abidjan-Niger line is up for debate among historians. The
position of the SFIO was that of feeling “embarrassée” because it did not want to destroy its
voter pool by going against the strike but it also wanted to stay in the good graces of the
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colonial government. 235 Overall, the actions of parties and governing bodies in AOF revealed
an unwillingness to align with the strike, to help strikers, or to say anything that would
discredit their privileged position with the colonial administration, just as François Gning had
done as union leader. Although this led to some later voter retaliations, many the politicians
and parties went on to become the leaders their newly-independent nations.
Individual politicians, however, did have some effect on the strike. Houphuët-Boigny was
one such figure. He promised money and support, but he was the cause of the AbidjanNiger’s break from the strike movement, according to Mor Sene 236 and Frederick Cooper. 237
On January 5, 1948, most of the Abidjan-Niger cheminots returned to work, though SuretCanale points out that only 60% of workers actually returned. 238 The Inspecteur-Général du
Travail in Dakar credited Houphuët-Boigny’s “intervention” with spurring the Ivorian
collapse. 1947 police reports “suggested that [Houphuët-Boigny] was privately at odds with
the strikers. Certainly, his Communist allies in the Chamber of Deputies considered him
suspect, since his primary occupation as a cocoa planter made him dependent on the
railroad…Years later several strike participants hinted that [Houphuët-Boigny] was more
interested in expanding his own power base during the strike than in promoting the workers’
grievances.” 239 This accusation of manipulation of events for political advancement was not
only reserved to Houphuët-Boigny, but even more reviled by cheminots were total inaction
and treachery.
Lamine Guèye managed to remain completely inactive during the strike. Guèye, “anxious
to preserve [his] relationship with [his] metropolitan allies,” stayed silent in public, 240 but he
met privately with strikers to dissuade them from continuing the work moratorium. 241 He is
attributed with saying: “This time I will not occupy myself with the strike (Cette fois je ne
m’occuperai pas de la grève).” 242 According to Cooper, however, he did not take part in any
strike, having also avoided the General Strike of 1946, and that he “had ‘disappointed the
strikers’ in avoiding all situations in which he could have pronounced [an opinion] (avait
‘déçue les grévistes’ en evitant toute situation dans laquelle il pouvait avoir à se
prononcer).” 243
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attempted to put a stop to the strike.
Deputy Fily Dabo Sissoko was one of these when he tried end the strike in Soudan. He
met with Sarr, who was convinced enough by his promises to prompt the union Comité
Directeur at Thiès to order him to reject Sissoko's initiatives, telegraphing: "A scalded cat
fears cold water...and we cannot base our return to work on a promise, above all when that
promise is stripped of any guarantee."

Despite Sissoko’s maneuverings, only seven

Soudanese workers went back to work on his requested day, February 2. 244 In the end,
Sissoko “lost all credibility” and in elections after the strike, he repeatedly lost out to his
rivals. 245 The cheminots were a powerful voting bloc.
The most difficult politician to study is Senghor, who is loved and disliked by many excheminots. Senghor never publicly backed the strike or the cheminots, according to Cooper,
who nonetheless mentions that Senghor did meet with the union leadership in private to
express support, 246 and that furthermore, “In Senegal, Senghor is said to have helped settle the
strike.” 247

Mor Sene asserted that Senghor especially remained supportive of the strike

movement during the entirety of the strike, writing a letter to the Minister of Overseas
Territories in June of 1947 on behalf of the strikers. 248 Enclosed were also the union's
demands and a written piece by Sarr called "The History of the Situation." Senghor appealed
for a settlement free of discrimination, in the "spirit" of the French Constitution. 249 SuretCanale examined Senghor’s writings to illustrate his opinions on the politician. La Condition
Humaine, a bimonthly paper created by Senghor, made no mention of the strike until the 26th
of April, over a month after the strike had ended. In this article, “Les Leçons de la grève du
rail,” Senghor stated that he had not written about the strike in the hopes of achieving “une
solution de compromis” an action justified by the end of the strike. He went on to praise the
Minister of Overseas Territories with having promoted Béchard to Haut-Commissaire because
he stopped the strike. Senghor then praised the strikers as well. 250 For Senghor, the wishywashy position seemed the best, and such a stance not only made him a non-threatening
leadership option for the colonial administration, it made him a hero of sorts with the
cheminots, or at least their leaders.
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The Strike Settlement
On January second, there were 836 strikers back to work, and 2,416 hired strikebreakers.
The Dakar-Niger remained the most “solid” line: there were 1,125 workers (of both races) for
a job of 6,765 workers. The Conakry-Niger had 1,196 for the work of 2,014 and the AbdijanNiger had 1,424 or 3,111. On Feb 1st, 1948, the Dakar-Niger was at 32% for the number of
workers theoretically needed on the line, the Conkary-Niger at 54% and the Benin-Niger at
16%. The Abdijan-Niger had already broken the strike. In total, the Régie's numbers were at
34% staff for theoretical staffing capacity.

The strikebreakers were also new and

inexperienced, lowering production levels. 251 As for passenger traffic, in mid-February on
the Dakar-Niger, it was at 12% of its recent average and merchandise at 43%, on the
Conkary-Niger passengers were at 20%, goods at 48%. On the Benin-Niger: passengers were
at 10% capacity, goods at 30%. This hurt the metropolitan supply system as well as West
Africa's. The strike also coincided with the launch of a 1946 "development" initiative,
making it harder to get farmers to produce what the administration had been trying to get
them produce and to get workers to work: "the railway strike served to both undermine its
economic goals and take the luster off its ideological intervention.” 252
On the 22nd of February, Paul Béchard was named the new Haut-Commissaire, replacing
Barthes. He was expected to carry out the desire of the Métropole, which was to end the
strike as soon as possible. 253

Béchard was “moins radical et plus conciliateur que son

prédécesseur.” 254 This can be seen in the ANS documents written by Barthes and Béchard’s
offices in consecutive years called “Instructions relatives à la sécurité intérieur de l’AOF” in
1947 and 1948. Although the text of both documents is very similar, the men’s philosophies
can be seen in linguistic differences such as Barthes’s use of “repression” as a technique to
avoid and to end internal conflict in the colonies (including strikes) 255 and Béchard’s
concentration on how any “mésures d’intervention” should come “en dernier recours (as a last
resort).”

Béchard also dedicated significantly more time to “mésures preventatives,”256

though both men approved the use of grenades in quelling internal security crises. These
alterations, however, could also signal a more concerted effort on the part of colonialists to
mask their true ideology behind the rhetoric of equality and compromise.
From the 26th of February onward, Béchard met on separate with the Régie, the FSCA,
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and local politicians. In early March, he took a tour of AOF and announced that he would put
an end to the strike that had contributed to “the economic meltdown of the AOF
(l’effondrement économique de l’AOF).” 257 Béchard put in new proposals varied slightly
from the arbitration ruling, including no punishment for striking (since the Régie had
threatened sanctions), the Régie would take back all cadre personnel, strikebreakers would
get to keep their jobs, and auxiliaries would be hired back from highest to lowest seniority
until all staff levels were at capacity. The union approved on March 15, 1948, with one
stipulation: all auxiliaries must get their jobs back. 258 The concessions were:
•
•
•
•

•
•

Auxiliaries would get retroactive integration: May 1, 1947, for pay
and January 1 for seniority (The union had demanded January 1 for
both, the Régie: Oct 1 for both, the arbitration ruling: 15July)
Certain agents in the cadre secondaire would be reclassed
according to the Régie’s original interpretation, but they would
also receive extra seniority.
The exam required to move between was compromised between
Union and Régie levels.
Workers would get 15 days of leave per year (as demanded by
Union, rejected by the Régie and reduced to 10 days by the
arbitration committee, but only for family events and if the service
could handle the absence).
Housing and indemnities could not be guaranteed, which kept with
the Régie and arbitration ruling decisions (the Union wanted both
increased).
The Union demand for uniform housing indemnities that were
equal to the highest pay scale was rejected, with Béchard holding
to the Régie and arbitrational incorporation of the old hierarchy
into the wage scale and adding indemnities to areas with a high
cost of living.

Béchard then compromised with the union on its stipulation: strikers would be protected but
auxiliaries would be taken back “in principle.” Striking auxiliaries who were eligible for
integration before the strike kept the benefits of transition, exam barriers were eased, strike
days were not paid, a raise in wages would occur to offset the rise in the cost of living, there
would be expatriate and displacement benefits, management benefits were increased by 20%,
and indemnities were increased in Dakar, Abdijan, and other cities. The date to return to
work was fixed for March 19. A month later, the Régie cut jobs and the auxiliaries lost their
jobs based on seniority and competence. 259 According to James Jones, “the strikers settled for
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an agreement that was essentially identical to the terms offered by the arbitration appeals
committee on 31 October 1947. The agreement failed to prevent worker layoffs, but it
established the principle that workers should be paid the same regardless of race.” Workers
who were not laid off also got pay increases but “it took another six years before they
obtained ‘equal work for equal pay’.” 260 The protocol was presented to the cheminots as a
victory, but according to Suret-Canale, it was only “partially” one. The administration had to
recognize the legitimacy of the strike by retracting threats of punishment for illegal striking,
had to instate the cadre unique, but “for the rest, except for a few small details, it was the
Régie’s viewpoint (affirmed by the sub-arbitrational ruling) that prevailed (pour la reste, à
quelques details près, c’est le point-de-vue de la Régie (repris par la sentence surarbitrale) qui
prévaut).” 261 Haut-Commissaire Béchard said of the strike: “There are no vanquishers or
vanquished, there are only losers: the AOF economy, the cheminots, and the Régie (Il n’y a ni
vainqueurs, ni vainqus, il n’y a que perdants: l’économie de l’AOF, les cheminots, et le
Régie).” 262 On the question of the economy, according to Mor Sene, the strike cost the Régie
“several” million francs in lost revenue and from money spent trying to restart work. For the
AOF and metropolitan economies, the strike created “a serious disturbance in the exchange
system…Many products rotted in the interior…The strike would pulverize the AOF economy
(une grave perturbation du système des échanges…Beaucoup de produits pourissaient à
l’intérieur…La grève allait pulvériser l’économie de l’AOF).” 263 Furthermore, the strike was
not a losing situation for everyone: According to AK Sow, some of the auxiliaries integrated
into the new cadre unique, had their salaries quadruple. 264
Cooper called the strike a power struggle that was about whether or not “workers would or
would not have a say in professional structure that was theoretically non-racial (les
travailleurs auraient ou non leur mot à dire dans une structure professionnelle théoriquement
non raciale).” 265 The Régie cadre system, for Cooper, was rather a “a French structure than a
backward colonial organization based on race. But the question of the manner in which this
power would be exerted inside the structure would be the real reason for the strike (une
structure française q’une organisation coloniale arriérée basée sur la race. Mais la question de
la manière dont ce pouvoir était éxercé à l’intérieur de la structure allait être la raison même
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de la grève).” 266 Cooper, however, overlooks the fact that despite whatever language or
structure the Régie had used, despite its parallels to a French structure, the cadre system was
carried out with the knowledge that it was a racially-discriminatory system, one meant to
divide African technician from African auxiliary, and above all, European management from
African worker. This system worked for a time, which is best exemplified by the strike of
1938, but in rejecting cadre privilege for the deeper bonds of community and work solidarity,
the West African cheminot managed to stand up to the colonial presence.
In the late 1940s, there were many strikes in French and British Africa, all of which were
significant for their length, the fact that they occurred across industrial or regional borders,
and because they attacked the vulnerabilities of the colonial state, especially the transport
sector. 267 The railroad strike of 1947-1948 was one of the better known of these strikes. It
“destroyed all African trust” 268 in the French and their ideologies as well as pointing out
parallel hypocrisies among the elite évolués and assimilés who played up their African origins
or their “reformed” ways when needed. Politicians could be useful tools for some, but they
were not to be trusted, and the old Quatre Communes elite that took power at independence
might have held leadership positions, but they could also be as easily challenged as the French
colonial system.

As African workers moved into the wage system and embraced

industrialization and all of the rights that went with it, they proved, through the strike, that
they “remained linked to their society in ways that could oppose French assimilation. After
the strike ended, those links were even stronger because railroad workers felt indebted to the
community that had sustained them. They continued to make payments on that debt all the
way to independence.” 269

Furthermore, a new generation of unionists that opposed

complacency and evolution exerted itself, punishing older establishment figures and
demanding action and change. If, in the end that change did not come in tangible ways, it still
existed, as empowerment and confidence, as unification and strength.

After the Strike
After the strike was over, after the lay-offs of about a thousand cheminots 270 and the
numerous discussions and struggles between the strikers and the Régie over the terms of the
strike, politics enveloped the cheminot movement. Senghor jumped on the strike movement
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after it was over, bringing Ibrahima Sarr and other cheminot leaders into his fold. Mamadou
Dia, the first prime minister of Senegal and one-time ally of Senghor, was one of the greatest
advocates for the recognition of the cheminots and particularly of Sarr in his memoirs: “It was
the cheminots in that time that were the best political recruiting agents, the best members of
the parties (C’étaient les cheminots, en ce temps-là, qui étaient les meilleurs agents de
recrutement politique, les meilleurs agents des parties).” 271
When Senghor left SFIO in September of 1948 to create le Bloc Démocratique
Sénégalais (BDS), he said that SFIO was “in Africa, at least, not democratic or socialist in its
action (en Afrique, du moins, ni démocratique, ni socialiste dans son action),” and that it “no
longer defended the interests of overseas workers but [instead] its own electoral interests (ne
defend plus les interêts des travailleurs d’outre-mer mais ses interêts electoraux).” 272
Senghor’s rhetoric immediately pointed to his concern over the worker, and his subsequent
actions pointed to his concentration on winning over the cheminots to his side. Senghor’s
SFIO break occurred because he knew the cheminots would follow him, according to Mor
Sene. Abdoulaye Ba, in an interview with Mor Sene, said: “In effect, we all took our
vacations and canvassed [literally, ‘furrowed’] the country, campaigning for BDS (En
effet…nous avions tous pris nos congés et avions sillonné tout le pays pour faire la campagne
en faveur du BDS.” The first BDS convention was at Thiès, the center of the cheminot labor
movement for as long as the movement had existed.

273

According to Cooper, Senghor “is

remembered in Thiès for having incorporated the railway workers' union into his political
movement, but with more than a hint that the workers did more for him that he for them.” 274
Overall, it was Sarr, said Mamadou Dia, who really put Senghor on the map among the
cheminots. In his memoirs he recollected a public gathering with Sarr and Senghor: “On all
the route, the people were crying ‘Long live Sarr!’

They were not crying ‘Long live

Senghor!’ This is important for the good reason that no one knew Senghor…It was Sarr they
knew (Sur tout le parcours, les gens criaient ‘vivre Sarr!’ Ils ne criaent pas ‘Vive Senghor!’
Ceci est important. Pour la bonne raison qu’on ne connaissait pas Senghor...C’est Sarr que
l’on connaissait).” 275

In 1956, a new youth movement, the third generation of militant

unionists, accused Sarr and his erstwhile UJT upstarts of focusing on their political careers
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and not the workers.

276

Sarr moved into the left wing of BDS, and aligned himself with

Mamadou Dia. In the political crisis of 1962 in which Senghor and Dia broke relations, Sarr
was imprisoned.
The Dakar-Niger was reduced to two lines in 1960. It “no longer controlled the flow
of external trade and the union was no longer decisive in the formation of public opinion.”
The Mali Federation, which formed an alliance between Senegal and the Soudan at
independence, broke down just a few months later. The breakdown closed the borders and in
the interval until they reopened in 1963, trucks had taken over as the main transportation
option. 277 The Dakar-Niger faced the same economic struggles as Senegal throughout the
latter half of the 20th Century. The train, according to a policeman from the Société National
des Chemins de Fer du Sénégal (SNCS), the rail was bought out and was run by a private
company. 278 Abdoulaye Cissé confirmed this, saying that it was bought out by Canadians in
2003, who bought the entire line, from Dakar to Bamako. 279 Participant observation at the
Dakar and Thiès gares as well as on the train from Dakar to Thiès confirmed the lowered
status of the train as a commercial and transportation enterprise: “it’s no longer the ‘artery’ of
AOF/Senegalese/Malian economic export. That was taken over by trucks long ago. Now,
however, it’s the small vendors, shaking food, dish towels, used clothing, etc. Manufactured
goods being sold along the line, much as the colonial export economy worked.” 280 The
documentary Dakar-Bamako (1991) includes extensive footage of the retail that occurred
around the Dakar-Niger in the 1990s, when the train ran twice a week between Dakar and
Bamako: the line seemed to have formed an entirely specialized form of trade designed
around rail traffic. 281 Chemino union presence definitely diminished over the years after
independence, a fact made clear by the May Day workers’ march in Thiès in 2007, where
there was no observed cheminot presence. 282 Furthermore, according to two ex-cheminots
interviewed at the Thiès gare, Pappa Madiaye Seck and Abdoulaye Tall, who made careers as
a switchman and a mechanic, respectively, there are still problems with auxiliary integration:
neither of them had been integrated, despite over thirty years of service each. To get into the
cadre, they said, a cheminot has to hire a lawyer. 283
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V. Conclusion
Implications of analysis, refer back to thesis/summary/broaden out

The cheminot strike of 1947-1948 could not have happened without the previous
history of coercion, resistance, and community that had marked each stage of the development
of the railroad. From the earliest conception of the railroad, Faidherbe’s dream of conquering
the unknown but Eldorado-like political and economic resources that lay east of the strip of
Senegalese land occupied by the French, the Dakar-Niger played a central role in the changes
that would come to Senegal and would reflect the overall policies of the colonial government.
Forced labor, the racialization of the work force, and strong West African resistance to
colonial presence were all born or grew beside the train line. The economic problems that
plagued the railroad as well as an early revelation of colonial hypocrisy would carry all the
way through the colonial period and would greatly effect the policies and actions on the part
of the administration and of colonized peoples. The limits on the colonial budget meant that
conquest, construction, and control had to be cost-effective. In attempting this, the cheap and
dirty methods used by the colonial state actually ended up being more time-consuming and
leaving bad results in its wake. Even as colonial practice divided the labor force into skilled
and unskilled, based on a racial hierarchy that saw Africans as inferior peasants incapable of
European work, these economic constraints made the state to take on Africans as skilled wage
laborers. This complex dichotomy of peasant and worker, of citizen and subject, of white and
black, would suffer a third division once the administration realized the benefits of splitting
Africans into two categories: the intermediary évolués and the majority indigenes. This
schism would inspire the Thiès 1938 action and would force Africans to reevaluate the status
of being a Quatre Commune assimilé: this category, once the black leadership of the colonies,
would have to prove its dedication to the mainstream in order to function. This was the fatal
mistake that Gning made: he depended too heavily on support from the top, when he should
have been looking to the numbers underneath him.
The ingenuity of the 1947 strike was its insistence on African unity, on turning away
from the class distinctions to fight against the management. That this management was
European is not unimportant: despite the fact that the union members who led the strike
insisted that theirs was not a struggle about anticolonialism, they were demanding equality in
a system that required inequality. The very action of using the rhetoric of the French was not
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a way to follow the French, but to break from them. The reality for colonized peoples was not
the life of a metropolitan citizen, and it was made clear after Brazzaville, labor law after labor
law, and colonial discriminatory action that the colonial state had no intention of extending
equality, which was merely a buzzword meant to dampen threatening militancy.
The resistance to the forced labor practices of military leaders during rail construction,
which was often an individual act that nonetheless damaged the system was a constant
phenomenon throughout the colonial period. That resistance would expand over time, from
desertions and work delays on a one-person scale to desertions and work delays on a massive
scale. The techniques did not change but the numbers of resistors did. Although early
desertions frustrated colonial administrators, once West African labor banded together, the
administration could do little to stop it from, at the very least, being recognized. The actions
of the colonial state towards strikers and resistors, from increased punishments for deserters
and the bloody repression of the 1938 strike to the increase of individual wages to encourage
volunteering and the massive reorganization of pay scales to appease angry workers, proved
to fall on two opposite sides. Reactions were of total repression or of complete surrender.
These contrasting actions served to encourage and mobilize workers by proving their power to
demand change and by angering the populace so that policies would be put into question. In
the 1947 strike, when the administration did not cave immediately or resort to violence, since
the strikers remained calm, the tactic became that the waiting game, which would prove that
the strikers would withstand huge hardships to challenge the administration, and that even if
their demands were not entirely met, they could maintain and they could unite.
The relationship of the union and of politics is a complex one, pointing in many
directions. The cheminot union, at the strike of 1947, stayed away from politicians officially,
but they could not escape them. Politics were at the center of union affiliation and action
from the beginning, when Gning aligned with SFIO and the colonial administration, to the
end, when Senghor harnessed the voter potential of the union for his political victory. Even if
the cheminots were “citoyens rëkk,” they were still a part of the political process.
The reluctance of ex-strikers to adamant to deny the relationship between politicians
and the union marks an interesting turn in the revision of historical fact. For the ex-strikers
today, cheminots were citizens free to chose their own parties, to be politically-active or
inactive, but in their hearts, they were cheminots, which was not a label but “une race.” 284
The events that would follow the strike were painful. Politicians broke down the union,

284

Cissé, interview.

68
splitting the Mali Federation and the cheminot’s geographical strength in two. Senghor and
even perhaps Sarr turned their backs on the union once they had established political careers,
and Senghor would even imprison the man that had helped propel him to the leadership of
Senegal. Furthermore, historians and writers would co-opt the movement for their own ends
as well. The contempt that Abdoulaye Cissé showed for what he called the “théâtre” of God’s
Bits of Wood by Ousmane Sembene and for this author’s attempts to draw connections
between politicians and strikers 285 could demonstrate a frustration with the various parties that
used the strike to fulfill a preconceived vision. Ex-striker oral histories are not free of bias,
and neither is this account. The “true” history of the strike can probably no longer be
discovered, since the witnesses themselves have mixed fact with fiction, have changed events
in their minds to reflect the dissatisfaction they felt due to events that took place long after the
strike, historians have read each others’ accounts, and almost everyone having anything to do
with the strike or the study of it has heard of or read God’s Bits of Wood. To echo Pelisson,
perhaps there is no truth, there is no untruth, there is only the strike. For this study, however,
certain patterns and events, when analyzed, point to the radical nature of the strike in its time,
for its break with past conciliatory leaderships, its challenge to the administration, for its use
of the language of the oppressor to attempt to silence the false rhetoric of equality and dispose
of the practice of inequality that kept the colonial state in charge. Despite what would come
after, the mess of political drama and the diminishment of the union and of the railroad, the
the history of the Dakar-Niger is that of coercion and of resistance that culminated in the
1947-1948 strike of the cheminots. For the strikers and resistors of each cheminot generation,
“Tout travail doit nourrir son home, (all work must nourish its man),” 286 and their struggles
against the labor systems that did not sustain them economically, politically, or spiritually,
allowed them to assert their demands and their rights over the whole history of the DakarNiger.
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VI. APPENDIX

Map 1: 1931 Map of the Thiès-Niger (Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, Plate IV).
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Map 2: The Dakar-Niger, 1933 (Jones 39).

Image 1: The Dakar-Bamako Express Stopped at Thiès, 1931 (Gouvernment Général de
l’AOF, Plate XII).
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Image 2a and 2b: The Senegalese Peanut Export Economy at Kaolack, 1931.
(Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, Plate IX).
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Image 3 : The Bamako Gare, 1931. (Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, Plate XXIV).

Image 4: The Bafing River Bridge, postard. (Jones, 18).
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VII. List of Acronyms
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

AOF: Afrique Occidentale Française
ANS: Archives Nationales du Sénégal
CGT: Confédération Générale du Travail
FSCA: Fédération des Syndicats des Cheminots Africains
FSM: Fédération Syndicale Mondiale
GEC: Groupes d’Etudes Communistes
PCF: Parti Communiste Français
RDA: Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
SFIO: Séction Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière
SNCS: Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Sénégal
STIDN: Syndicat des Travailleurs Indigènes du Dakar-Niger
UCAD: Université Cheikh Anta Diop
UJT: Union des Jeunes de Thiès
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